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A major strand of social justice activism, both within and outside the U.S.,
finds purpose in opposition to the economic, political, and social conditions of
globalization and neoliberalism. In these campaigns, targeting both the state
and powerful private entities, these numerous, loosely-linked movements of
resistance1 both confront and creatively make use of legal structures, including
courts, elected officials, and regulatory agencies. 2 The adversarial campaign for
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their publications.
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I. See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. L.
REV. 741, 763-64 (1994) (citing EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 209-20 (1993)
(defining "resistance culture" as including both the reconstitution of the culture and identity of a
subordinated population and an intervention into the dominant culture in efforts to transform it)).
2. Critics call this structural framework "liberal legalism." See Wendy Brown & Janet
Halley, Introduction, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 5-25 (Brown & Halley eds., 2002)
[hereinafter LEFT LEGALISM]. The framework is animated by the political vision of classical
liberalism-"democratic constitutionalism rooted in abstract individualism," id. at 5-and married
to the implementing force of legalism, which "translates wide-ranging political questions into
more narrowly framed legal questions." Id. at 19.
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immigrant workers in New York against a corporate chain of high-end
restaurants that began in August 2003 and lasted eighteen months, is the subject
of this article. It included a range of legal and extralegal pressure tactics
initiated by both sides, including direct action protests, lawsuits in state and
federal court, and charges before the National Labor Relations Board. It ended
with the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement agreement between the
worker-members of the Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (ROC-
NY)-a worker center based in Manhattan-and the corporation.
Part I offers a brief description of the socio-economic landscape in which
immigrant workers labor in U.S. urban centers, with a particular focus on
workers in the restaurant industry. Part II describes the key players-the ROC-
NY organizers, the lawyers and law students of the CUNY Immigrant and
Refugee Rights Clinic, and the restaurant workers themselves-and provides a
short history of the campaign. Embedded in this section is a discussion of the
limits and promise of legal remedies in improving the conditions of work for
immigrant labor. In Part III, I define the parameters of the role that public
interest lawyers played in the campaign. This role definition is of particular
interest to me because progressive public interest lawyers have struggled in
recent years with critiques of their work from both ends of the political
spectrum 3 and have received diminished institutional support for the legal
representation of the poor.4 Other scholars have described encounters between
resistance movements and law in great detail and with rich analysis.5 While the
broader implications and limitations of "liberal legalism" inform the backdrop
of this article, this article primarily focuses on progressive public interest
lawyers-the conflicted agents of the legal system, sympathetic to the methods
and goals of resistance movements but bound by the forms of the legal
establishment. This article offers a study of one campaign in which lawyers
collaborated with a resistance movement and examines both the dangers and
the promises of this approach to public interest lawyering.
3. See Martha Minow, Lawyeringfor Human Dignity, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y &
L. 143 (2002-2003) (discussing the challenges to progressive public interest lawyers in the present
historical moment); Martha Minow, Political Lawyering: An Introduction, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 287 (1996).
4. See Marc Galanter, "Old and In the Way ": The Coming Demographic Transformation of
the Legal Profession and Its Implications for the Provision of Legal Services, 1999 Wisc. L. REV.
1081, 1103-04 (1999) ("In the course of fifteen years [between 1982 and 1997], the relative share
expended on civil legal services for the poor was halved." Id. at 1104.).
5. See, e.g., Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Limits of Law in counter-hegemonic globalization:
the Indian Supreme Court and the Narmada Valley struggle, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM
BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 183-217 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Csar A.
Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2005) [hereinafter LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW]; JOEL




IMMIGRANT LABOR IN U.S. URBAN CENTERS
A. The Restaurant Industry in New York City
Unlike many other sectors of the service economy, the restaurant industry
is an important site for worker organizing due to its size and because it offers
poor immigrant workers access to living wage jobs. The industry is the largest
private sector employer in the U.S. and one of the largest contributors to job
growth in New York. It encompasses a wide range of business establishments,
from small proprietorships to multinational corporate entities, at both the high-
and low-ends of the market.6 Immigrant workers from the global South-Latin
America, Africa, and South and East Asia-provide the industry with the bulk
of its workforce. This is true especially in the low-skill, low-wage strata, and in
the high-end segment of the industry as kitchen workers (or the "back of
house" workers), table bussers, and runners between the kitchen and the dining
floor (or the "front of the house").7 Restaurant work provides a basic level of
income, in which even "back of the house" workers earn salaries that may keep
them above the poverty line and allow them to support their families.
Eventually, some workers transition to other higher-paying occupations within
the industry.
The path to employment in the industry is undefined and informal.
Employers recruit workers mostly by word-of-mouth and training is largely on-
the-job. There is a very low rate of union penetration in the industry 8 and
organizing workers is difficult in part because of the high turnover-new
workers constantly arrive and workers are fired or change jobs frequently.
Some employers use the workers' immigration status to maintain control over
the workforce, resist organizing drives, and keep wages and benefits low-a
practice particularly prevalent for the "back of the house" work that immigrants
of color are generally relegated to the high-end segment of the industry.
6. National Restaurant Association, Restaurant Industry Facts, May 25, 2007,
http://www.restaurant.org/researh/ind-glance.cfin (last visited Aug. 14, 2007).
7. See RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTER OF NEW YORK & NEW YORK CITY
RESTAURANT INDUSTRY COALITION, BEHIND THE KITCHEN DOOR: PERVASIVE INEQUALITY IN
NEW YORK'S THRIVING RESTAURANT INDUSTRY 5-8 (2005) [hereinafter BEHIND THE KITCHEN
DOOR], www.rocny.org/documents/RocNY final_compiled.pdf(last visited Aug. 14, 2007).
8. Less than one percent of the workforce in the restaurant industry in New York is
unionized. See Sarumathi Jayaraman, ROCing the Industry: Organizing Restaurant Workers in
New York, in THE NEW URBAN IMMIGRANT WORKFORCE: INNOVATIVE MODELS FOR LABOR




B. Undocumented Workers and the Decline of Unionization
Immigrant labor supports the restaurant industry in New York and a large
portion of the workforce is undocumented. As of March 2004, there were 11.1
million undocumented immigrants. 9 Just over seven million undocumented
immigrants were in the workforce, constituting about 4.9 percent of all U.S.
workers. 10 Over sixty percent of undocumented workers work for less than
twice the minimum wage, in contrast with only a third of all U.S. workers."I
Undocumented workers constitute just under 10 percent of the forty-three
million low-wage workers in the U.S. 12 Although there are cases of "super-
exploitation" in which workers are enslaved or assaulted by their employers,
most undocumented workers operate in everyday sweatshop conditions,
including consistent underpayment of wages for regular hours and overtime,
health and safety violations, and hierarchical relationships of power in the
workplace marked by low-intensity verbal abuse, and racial and sexual
harassment. 13
Although undocumented immigrants have been a part of the U.S.
workforce throughout its history, the movement of workers across national
borders has accelerated since 1982 as a result of economic crises in the global
South and the growth of the service economy in the U.S. in the 1990s. These
intensified migration patterns are one thread in the phenomenon of "economic
globalization," which, according to economist Jagdish Bhagwati, "constitutes
integration of national economies into the international economy through trade,
direct foreign investment (by corporations and multinationals), short-term
capital flows, international flows of workers and humanity generally, and flows
of technology." 14 Most critiques of globalization are rooted in opposition to the
"neoliberal" vision of globalization (also called the "Washington Consensus"),
derived from the 1980s agreement between the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury Department on a general set of policies
imposed upon borrower nations in the developing world. The neoliberal
program is one of fiscal austerity and cutbacks in social programs, privatization
of nationalized industries, often in the area of natural resources such as water
and precious metals, and market liberalization through lowered trade barriers
and less government intervention in the workplace and in transactions between
9. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. 1 (2006),
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportlD=61 (last visited Aug. 14, 2007).
10. See generally id.
11. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, ET AL., UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: FACTS AND FIGURES 2
(2004), http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/1000587_undoc-immigrants-facts.pdf (last visited
Aug. 14, 2007).
12. See generally id.
13. See JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
14-15 (2005).
14. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 3 (2004).
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private actors.15 As a result, economic and social conditions in developing
nations have deteriorated since the program's inception. This "pushed"
migrants north, largely to the U.S. and Europe. 16 The structural economic shift
in receiver countries from manufacturing to service production combined with
the strategies used by U.S. businesses to weaken labor solidarity have "pulled"
migrants across borders without documentation.' 7 Further, the growth of the
"informal economy"'18 in tandem with the expansion of service production in
large urban cities created strong demand for low-wage workers in jobs
characterized by contingency and insecurity. 19
This form of neoliberal globalization helped create the immigrant low-
wage sector of the U.S. economy. The U.S. and other countries of the north
undercut worker protection regimes at home and abroad. While the Washington
Consensus was imposed by the IMF and the World Bank on the countries of the
global South, governments in the global North reduced regulation of
employment relationships and undercut collective bargaining;
20
15. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 53 (2002). During the
transition from colonialism to independence, many countries in the global South adopted
economic programs that were a mix of free market and governmental command and control
policies. These newly independent nations sought to provide income support and other social
benefits to the people, to control their own natural resources and essential industries through
public ownership, and to aggressively intervene in relationships between employers and workers,
especially in industries marked by prior colonial exploitation. Through a combination of internal
failure due to corruption and cronyism, external pressure by private entities and lending
institutions in the U.S. and Western Europe, and the collapse of the patron states of the
Communist bloc, these countries suffered through a succession of economic crises. Policy-makers,
economists, and multinational corporations in the global North were hostile to the efforts of these
nations to erect legal walls around industries, natural resources, and cheap labor and gained the
leverage necessary to impose the conditions of the Washington Consensus in the 1980s and 1990s.
16. See Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches to
Law and Society in Conditions of Globalization, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 791, 797-801
(1995); Alejandro Portes & Jozsef Borocz, Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives
on its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation, 23 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 606, 607-09 (1989)
(describing current migration as a product of historical patterns of contact and penetration between
sending and receiving countries and criticizing push-pull theories that focus solely on contrasts in
living standards or governmental action).
17. See Frank Munger, Conclusion: Democratizing Poverty, in LABORING BELOW THE
LINE: THE NEW ETHNOGRAPHY OF POVERTY, Low-WAGE WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 295 (2002).
18. See Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New Developments and Old
Regulations, 103 YALE L.J. 2289 (1994).
19. See id. at 2294-99 ("The groups of service industries that were the driving economic
force in the 1980s were characterized by greater earnings and occupational dispersion, weak labor
unions, and mostly unsheltered jobs in the lower-paying echelons." Id. at 2294.).
20. See Bruno Caruso, Immigration Policies in Southern Europe: More State, Less Market,
in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 299, 303 (Joanne Conaghan, et al. eds., 2002)
(describing the interaction between enforcement of labor laws and immigration in southern versus
Northern Europe) (hereinafter LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION]. The Reagan
Administration made no secret of its antipathy to organized labor and accelerated deregulatory
initiatives in various industries. Funding of federal labor law enforcement in the U.S. has not kept
up with inflation and increases in the numbers of covered employees and businesses. ANNETTE
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simultaneously, undocumented immigration came to underpin the informal
economy. 21 In receiving countries, employers use pre-existing gender and
ethnic hierarchies for structuring the workplace and creating relations of
inequality between groups of workers.22 To avoid expulsion, undocumented
immigrants often refrain from attempts to enforce their labor rights, while
employers do not report undocumented workers to immigration authorities.
23
This informal, often unstated, mutual agreement between employer and
employees works through word-of-mouth recruitment processes to perpetuate
the chain of undocumented immigration to the global North 4
The movement of immigrants to the U.S. coincides with the growth of the
economy unregulated by the government-that is the informal sector-in terms
of worker protection, taxation, and, in some cases, even consumer protection.
Legitimate employers subject to the full range of government regulation are
increasingly intertwined with and resemble businesses in the informal sector,
especially in the low-wage segment of the economy. 25 This change in the
relationships between employers and employees in both the regulated and
unregulated sectors of the economy is a result, at least in part, of the weakening
union movement in the U.S. The declining power of labor unionism in the
BERNHARDT & SIOBHAN MCGRATH, ECONOMIC POLICY BRIEF: TRENDS IN WAGE AND HOUR
ENFORCEMENT BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 1975-2004, (Sept. 2005),
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/downloadfile._8423.pdf (last visited Aug. 14,
2007) ("Our analysis indicates that over the past three decades, enforcement resources and
activities of the U.S. Department of Labor have either stagnated or declined, at the same time that
the number of workers and workplaces in the country has expanded. In combination, these two
trends indicate a significant reduction in the government's capacity to ensure that employers are
complying with the most basic workplace laws." Id. at 1.).
21. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 46 ("[U]ndocumented immigrants' fear of deportation
and their lack of legal status make them particularly likely to gravitate toward the underground
economy, made up of businesses that operate on cash with little regard for government
regulations." Id. at 46.).
22. Occupational segregation was a focus of a successful deportation defense in In re
Herrera-Priego, U.S. D.O.J. E.O.I.R. July 10, 2003 (Lamb, Immigration J.), available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/practiceareas/immigration/pdfs/web428.pdf (last visited Aug. 14,
2007) and discussed further by lead attorney Michael J. Wishnie, Introduction: The Border
Crossed Us, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L & Soc. CHANGE 389, 389 (2004). The workplace was composed
of Latino, Chinese, and Polish workers who did different kinds of work and were subject to
varying levels of attention by immigration enforcement authorities during a workplace raid. See
Laura Ho et al., (Dis)assembling Rights of Women Workers Along the Global Assembly Line:
Human Rights and the Garment Industry, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 383 (1996) (discussing the
low status of women workers on the economic ladder). See also Julie A. Su, Making the Invisible
Visible: The Garment Industry's Dirty Laundry, I J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 405, 411 (1998)
(describing the challenge of bridging Thai and Latino garment workers in opposition to
exploitative employers).
23. See Michael J. Wishnie, supra note 23, at 389-94 (describing the correlation between
labor disputes in workplaces and immigrant enforcement raids); Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented
Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345,401 (2001).
24. See Caruso, supra note 21, at 311-12 (describing the situation in Italy).
25. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 48.
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workplace throughout the second half of the twentieth century hinged on at
least two factors: (1) the mobility of corporations and the implicit use by
employers of a large mass of unorganized workers in developing countries to
gain bargaining leverage over American unions, and (2) the transformation of
manufactured production from fixed geographic contexts to more flexible,
contingent, and multi-jurisdictional forms of production. 26 As capital has
flowed south and highly unionized segments of the American economy has
relocated to nations with cheaper labor costs, the importation of migrant
workers from developing nations has become the de facto policy of the U.S.
27
and accelerates the de-unionization of a workforce with limited collective
bargaining power.28  The state simultaneously constructs heavily-policed
borders29 and adopts a schizophrenic tolerance of undocumented workers in the
U.S. 30 The specter of indiscriminately enforced immigration laws meets the
needs of employers and weakens collective action among workers. 31 Finally,
immigrant workers are excluded from full protection of U.S. labor laws or are
hired under temporary work and subcontractor employment arrangements,
further undermining organizing and preventing workers from holding deep-
pocketed employers liable for violations of labor and employment laws.
32
26. BEVERLY J. SILVER, FORCES OF LABOR: WORKERS' MOVEMENTS AND GLOBALIZATION
SINCE 1870 3-5, (2003) (describing and then criticizing "race to the bottom" arguments). Although
Silver argues against the inevitability of weakened labor movements, she indicates that the
fundamental shift in the world economy, which prevents profits in the corporate centers of the
global North from reaching mobilized working classes in newly industrialized nations of the
global South may sow unrest and preempt labor-management cooperation regimes in
manufacturing. Id. at 168-70. Labor in the service industries of the global North, such as
restaurant workers, will instead achieve some measure of countervailing power through creative
mobilization against highly profitable target employers, like high-end restaurant chains. Id. at 170-
73.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 43-47.
28. Frances Raday, The Decline of Union Power--Structural Inevitability or Policy Choice,
in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 20, at 353, 361-62 ("It is no secret
that the concept of employment is a legal construct with a status element not wholly determinable
by agreement between the parties. Hence, the possibility of using workers' services without
entering into an employment relationship with them is as much a consequence of law as of
economic factors") (citing George Gonos, The Contest Over "Employee" Status in the Postwar
U.S.: The Case of Temporary Help Firms, 31 LAW & Soc. REV. 81, 83 (1997)).
29. David Graeber, The New Anarchists, in A MOVEMENT OF MOVEMENTS 202, 206 (Tom
Mertes ed., 2004) ("[T]he neoliberal vision of 'globalization' is pretty much limited to the
movement of capital and commodities, and actually increases barriers against the free flow of
people, information, and ideas-the size of the US border guard has almost tripled since the
signing of NAFTA.... This is another thing to bear in mind when people talk about the decline of
'sovereignty' in the contemporary world: the main achievement of the nation-state in the last
century has been the establishment of a uniform grid of heavily policed barriers across the world."
Id.).
30. See infra note 42.
31. See Graeber, supra note 29.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 120-124; Laura Ho et al., supra note 22, at 409-10;
Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop:
Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 997-1002 (1999)
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C. Immigration Enforcement and Immigrant Workers
While undocumented workers like those ROC-NY organized often do not
enjoy the protections of the labor and employment laws, they find themselves
subject to increasingly stringent enforcement by immigration statutes. Recent
enforcement initiatives by government agencies threaten immigrant workers
with arrest and detention (local police authority to enforce federal immigration
law),33 termination of employment (Social Security Administration's new
proposed "no match" rules),34 and loss of the ability to drive to work (federal
(describing the vertical disaggregation of the garment industry for the purpose of avoiding liability
for legal violations).
33. In 2002, the Department of Justice reversed its long-held view that immigration
enforcement is exclusively a function of the federal government and deemed local law
enforcement officials to have "inherent authority" to enforce immigration law. See Michael J.
Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084,
1090-91 (2004); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why
Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.
Rav. 965, 1003 (2004) (The DOJ's position "creaties] a thousand borders-the result of allowing
local authorities to decide for themselves whether to enforce immigration laws and then having
those local authorities be bound by different state laws that affect their enforcement authority."
Id.); After joint local-federal immigration raids, immigrant communities remain distrustful of local
government agencies, including the police. Terry Golway, Back Into the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2005, § 14NJ, at 1; Local agencies are increasingly invoking the 1996 changes in the
Immigration and Nationality Act to request federal training in immigration enforcement and are
reporting non-citizens with minor offenses to immigration officials. Paul Vitello, Path to
Deportation Can Start With a Traffic Stop, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2006, at Al; Some police
officers oppose such deputization practices. Joe Cantlupe, Proposal Targets Migrants' offenses;
Police Say They Lack Resources to Make Arrests, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 29, 2003, at Al;
The FBI database--to which state and local police have access-now holds immigration
information in addition to criminal activity; police officers are encouraged to make immigration
arrests, whether the infractions are criminal or civil, including arrests of student-visa violators.
Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement, supra note 33, at 1095-97. The Court held in US.
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975), that "Mexican appearance" was a "relevant factor"
in an INS stop. Such racial profiling, a widespread practice in immigration enforcement, is
extended to local police who cooperate with the federal government. Wishnie, State and Local
Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, supra, at 1102-05; Muzaffar A. Chishti, The Role of
States in US. Immigration Policy, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 371, 374 (2004) ("Local law
enforcement officers, untrained in the complexities of immigration regulations, are more likely to
use race or ethnicity as a substitute for reasonable cause." Id.).
34. In June 2006, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) proposed new rules
regarding employers' responsibilities upon receipt of a letter from the Social Security
Administration (SSA) indicating the lack of a match between an employee's social security
number and government records. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-
Match Letter, 71 Fed. Reg. 34281-01 (June 14, 2006) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274(a)). Under
the pending rules, employers would be required to take a number of steps possibly leading to the
termination of an employee. National Immigrant Law Center, DHS Announces It Has Finalized
"Safe Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter" Rule, Aug. 10, 2007,
http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/SSARelatedInfo/ssa002.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2007). If
these steps are not taken within a certain period of time, the employer is assumed to have
"constructive knowledge" of an employee's lack of authorization to work in the U.S. and could
face fines and penalties. Id. These rules, if adopted, will provide employers with a legal
justification for the termination of immigrant workers involved in organizing. Under current law,
1886 [Vol. 95:1879
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and state changes in eligibility for driver's licenses). The 1996 amendments
to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 36 as well as the heightened profile of
immigration enforcement in local communities since 9/11, accelerated the
detention and deportation of immigrants.37 Deportations rose 12 percent
between 2005 and 2006 to 189,924, part of an overall 75 percent increase
between 2000 and 2006.38 Since the 1996 amendments, immigration
enforcement authorities focus on the detention and deportation of immigrants
with criminal convictions, including legal permanent residents. This
disproportionately impacts communities targeted by police enforcement
activity. 39 After 9/11, the government targeted male Arab and South Asian
Muslim immigrants through a series of enforcement initiatives with collateral
effects in other communities. Most recently, immigration authorities re-
SSA is not permitted to share "no-match" data with ICE. However, DHS is seeking access to SSA
records for the purpose of more efficient border patrol enforcement. See Press Release, Office of
the Press Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS Announces Federal Regulations
to Improve Worksite Enforcement and Asks Congress to Approve Social Security "No Match"
Data Sharing (June 9, 2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release._0925.shtn (last visited Aug. 14, 2007).
35. The Real ID Act requires that states confirm social security numbers or proof of
ineligibility prior to issuing drivers' licenses. Pub. L. 109-13 § 202(c)(1)(C) 106 Stat. 231 (2005).
See Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargos, "Aliens" in our Midst Post 9/11: Legislating
Outsiderness Within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 1683 (2004) (discussing fear of arrest
and deportation in immigrant communities as a result of passage of Real ID Act); Maria Pab6n
L6pez, More than a License to Drive: State Restrictions on the Use of Driver's Licenses by
Noncitizens, 29 S. I!!. U. L. J. 91 (2004) (survey of state restrictions on immigrant access to
driver's licenses).
36. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1936 (2000).
37. See Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The
Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1197 (2002);
Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law after September
11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 295, 297-98
(2002); Approximately 13,000 Arab and South Asian Muslims have been placed in deportation
proceedings since 9/11. Andrea Elliot, Study Finds City's Muslims Growing Closer Since 9/11,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,2004, at B4.
38. Nina Bernstein, Immigrants Go from Farms to Jails, and a Climate of Fear Settles In,
N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 24, 2006, § 1, at 21 (describing increased immigration enforcement activity).
39. See Morawetz, supra note 36, at 1945-46 ("The likelihood of deportation is greater in
communities that are subject to elevated levels of police activity and in which people are more
likely to be arrested and prosecuted." Id.).
40. See, e.g., 66 Fed. Reg. 48334-48335 (Sept. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
287.3(d)) (detention extended from 24 hours to 48 in general and to a "reasonable period of time"
during national emergencies); Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Naturalization
Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,508- 19,511 (Apr. 22, 2002) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 236 and 241) (in communicado detention for legitimate law enforcement
purposes); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet, Changes to National Security
Entry/Exit Registration System (NSEERS) (Dec. 1, 2003); Akram & Johnson, supra note 37, at
331 (noting that approximately 1000 immigrants were swept into custody in the days following
9/11); Ashar, supra note 37, at 1186-91 (describing arrest of detainee in a mosque); Elliot, supra
note 37; Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage Comes
Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849 (2003) (describing effects of recent enforcement initiatives in
2007] 1887
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focused on undocumented workers, mostly Latino, with an aggressive program
of workplace raids.
41
Aggressive immigration enforcement policies and a weakened worker
protection regime resulting from accelerated neoliberal globalization in the last
twenty years left immigrant workers vulnerable to both the state and
exploitative employers. Immigrant workers are trapped by their need to migrate
across national borders for survival, as nations attempt to wall off their
territorial boundaries and bear down upon those who have already crossed over.
The enforcement-only legislation adopted in late 200642 is a continuation of a
failed immigration policy. The U.S. Border Patrol doubled the number of
agents in the Southwest region from 4,000 to 8,000 between 1994 and 1998. 43
During this time, the death toll of migrants at the border increased, the duration
of migrants' stay in the U.S. increased, unauthorized immigration increased,
and the use and cost of immigrant smugglers increased.44 Heightened intensity
Latino immigrant communities); 78 No. 46 Interpreter Releases 1809, 1816 (Dec. 3, 2001)
("voluntary" interviews of 5000 young men from certain countries); James Stemgold & Diana
Jean Schemo, A Nation Challenged: Foreign Students; 10 Arrested in Visa Cases in San Diego,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at B 1 (first arrests of immigrant students for violations of their visas);
Dan Eggen, Deportee Sweep Will Start with Mideast Focus, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at AOl
(arrest of 6000 men from certain countries with final orders of deportation); DOJ Office of
Inspector General, The Immigration and Naturalization Service's Removal of Aliens Issued Final
Orders, Report No. 1-2003-004, Appendix B (Feb. 2003) (immigration violations entered into
national criminal database to facilitate local enforcement of immigration law); 8 C.F.R. § 264.1
(forced registration of non-immigrants from certain countries); Nurith C. Aizenman & Edward
Walsh, Immigrants Fear Deportation After Registration: Number of Mideast, Muslim Men Rises
Sharply, WASH. POST, July 28, 2003, at A01 (around 80,000 men submitted to "Special
Registration" and thousands put into deportation proceedings); Rights Working Group, Secret
Hearings and Detentions, http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/.q=SecretHearings (last visited
Aug. 14, 2007) (hundreds of immigrants deported without due process).
41. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 38; Julia Preston, U.S. Raids 6 Meat Plants in ID Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at A24; Nicholas Riccardi & Nicole Gaouette, Employers'
immigration pains, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, at 37. The crackdown on undocumented
inunigrants coincided with deliberation in Washington, D.C. on comprehensive immigration
reform and as the Bush Administration's guest worker proposals were attacked from the right by
anti-immigrant politicians and organizations. Political performance, rather than actual threats to
national security, seems to drive immigration enforcement at this time. See Muneer Ahmad, A
Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 1261, 1317-27 (2004) (discussing the effect of post-9/l 1 governmental racial profiling on
private hate crime perpetrators); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 954-59 (2002)
(discussing sacrifice of the liberties of a minority group to further the purported security interests
of the majority); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1582-83
(2002) (describing signals sent to the public by government law enforcement). Cumulatively,
post-9/l I enforcement initiatives have eroded workers' right to free association and their ability to
organize in the workplace. See also Ruben J. Garcia, Labor's Fragile Freedom of Association
Post-9/JJ, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 283 (2006); Wishnie, supra note 33, at 1104.
42. See Secure Fence Act, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006).
43. See THOMAS R. ELDRIDGE ET AL., 9/I1 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL: STAFF REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S. 99 (Aug. 21, 2004).
44. See BELINDA 1. REYES ET AL., PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, HOLDING
THE LINE? THE EFFECT OF THE RECENT BORDER BUILD-UP ON UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION
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of immigration enforcement is a cyclical phenomenon, dependent upon a
number of factors, including the state of the economy and actual and imagined
threats to national security. 45 However, the basic framework of national
territoriality remains unchanged,46 even as neoliberal globalization lowered
barriers for the movement of capital and goods across borders.
II
A CASE STUDY OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE:
THE RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTER OF NEW YORK
The organizers and worker-members of ROC-NY, with the essential
contributions of public interest lawyers, attached the face of a discrete
corporate entity to the abstract macropolitical conditions described in the
preceding part. The ROC-NY campaign against the restaurant corporation
involved a number of actors and took many turns. A description of the main
players in the campaign and the conduct of the campaign follows in the next
sections.
A. The Organizers
The ROC-NY organizers envisioned the campaign with the workers who
approached them and drove its progress through the eighteen month duration.
They arose from the ashes of the World Trade Center to pursue an ambitious
program of worker activism in the restaurant industry in New York City. The
organizers drew from strategies established by preceding worker centers,
especially in their use of law and lawyers, but also originated novel direct
action and law reform techniques to advance their cause.
1. The Origins of ROC-NY
In the aftermath of 9/11, the local of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees International Union ("HERE"), which represented restaurant
workers at Windows on the World at the top of the World Trade Center, started
a support group for surviving workers and families. The leaders of the group
transformed it from a source of emotional support to a model of collaboration
between workers, organizers, and lawyers. Immigrant labor organizer Saru
Jayaraman and three surviving Windows on the World workers 47 agreed in
viii-xi (2002), available at http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i= 58 (last visited Aug. 14,
2007).
45. See Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders, 51 UCLA L. REv. 193,244 (2003).
46. See MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA (2004) ("[T]he interstate system, aimed at achieving order and peace, was based on
'crustacean' borders. That changed, among other things, how nation-states regulated migration.
Rigid border controls, passports, and state restrictions on entry and exit became the norms for
governing emigration and immigration." Id. at 10.).
47. ROC-NY Deputy Director Fekkah Mamdouh was a key member of the leadership
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2002 to lead the new organization on the condition that they could undertake
aggressive and targeted workplace justice campaigns. Additionally, the leaders
expressed interest in originating a worker-directed research and public policy
program.
The union recruited Jayaraman because she created an innovative model
of organizing and advocacy at the Workplace Project, founded by Jennifer
Gordon in 1992.48 The story of immigrant workers in exurban Long Island,
New York, embodied in the creation and development by Gordon and her
colleagues of the Workplace Project, gained resonance in law and organizing
circles as the phenomenon of immigrant labor spread to all comers of the U.S.
and the labor movement grew to view immigrant organizing as necessary for its
survival and growth. Jayaraman created a program that built on Gordon's
original vision, drawing on an extensive study of various models of law and
organizing across the country, and with her new colleagues at ROC-NY
adapted her team-based organizing model for New York's restaurant industry.
49
The organization produced several successful early campaigns. In July
2002, a few months after the founding of ROC-NY, it launched its first
campaign against the owner of Windows on the World. After 9/11, the owner
moved quickly to open a new non-union restaurant in Times Square. 50 The
team, a leader in the workplace at Windows, and a complement to Jayaraman, who had limited
experience in the industry prior to 2002.
48. See Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road By Walking: Immigrant Workers, The
Wor place Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 Harv. C.L.-C.R. L. Rev. 407, 428-37
(1995) (describing the founding of the Workplace Project).
49. See Saru Jayaraman, La Alianza Para La Justicia: A Team Approach to Immigrant
Workers Organizing, in THE NEw IMMIGRANT URBAN IMMIGRANT WORKFORCE, supra note 8, at
85-104. Like Gordon, Jayaraman used popular education methods at the Workplace Project to
expand the scope of what workers understood to be possible through solidarity and collective
action. She also made clear that public policy reform, with the leadership of the workers
themselves, was an explicit and early goal of her work at the Workplace Prqject, just as it had
been for Gordon. See id. at 90-91; Gordon, supra note 13, at 115-41 (detailing Gordon's work).
However, at the Workplace Project Jayaraman departed from a drop-in law clinic model in favor
of more focused campaigns. Jayaraman organized teams of immigrant workers from multiple
workplaces by industry. She proposed that a consensus be reached on a larger public policy
campaign through discussion across teams. Individual workers would bring campaign proposals to
the team, which would in turn consider several proposals and decide whether to initiate a given
campaign. These were not the easiest cases or those that ensured the highest degree of worker self-
help. Rather, they were chosen because the problems addressed were prevalent and oppressive in
the industry, because the worker or workers who proposed the campaign compelled others to
support them through their contributions and commitment to the group, or if the target employer
was a bad actor of whom an example could be made through media work to raise rights
consciousness in immigrant communities and standards of employment in the industry. Jayaraman
also organized support from within the legal and labor fields for the Workplace Projects' goals.
She recruited pro bono and public interest attorneys to support the campaigns through litigation
and administrative advocacy. In addition, she worked extensively with the Association for Union
Democracy against locals that were not responsive to complaints made by immigrant workers at
union shops.
50. See id. at 145-46.
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surviving formerly unionized Windows on the World workers were not
welcomed at the Times Square establishment because it was a non-union
restaurant. ROC-NY moved quickly and used a combination of direct action
and media advocacy tactics to pressure the owner into hiring some of his
former workers from the World Trade Center with a similar package of wages
and benefits. Then, the organization worked with attorneys at the Puerto Rican
Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF) and with the New York
University Immigrant Rights Clinic (NYU-IRC) to target a famous diner
frequented by prominent New Yorkers on the Upper Eastside. The parties also
worked together for improving the working conditions at a greengrocer in
Brooklyn. In both cases, ROC-NY and its allies obtained good results. The
organizers and workers' committees of ROC-NY soon signaled the scope of
their ambition by adding new strategies to their work. They moved forward
with plans to open a worker-owned high-end restaurant. The cooperative would
demonstrate the viability of a business model in which profits are shared
throughout the job hierarchy.
Early in ROC-NY's existence, and based on their analysis of the industry
and their experience with the early campaigns, the organizers decided to focus
their workplace justice campaigns on the high-end portion of the sector in New
York, especially the corporate chains, on the theory that aggressive standard-
setting at the top would have an industry-wide effect. 51 In tandem with the
workplace justice campaigns, ROC-NY proposed legislation in the City
Council that would strengthen enforcement of wage and hour laws in the
restaurant industry. ROC-NY issued a 50-page industry analysis with policy
recommendations in 2005, which provided the basis or "findings" for the
legislation. 52 On the basis of the report, the organization initiated a dialogue
with an employers' group, the New York State Restaurant Association.53 The
legislation would allow workers to use violations of wage and hour laws to
make the case for revocation of restaurant licenses granted by the city. The
organization's ambitious agenda and its power grew quickly with each
successive initiative and campaign.
2. The Worker Center Movement in the U.S.
Upon its founding in 2002, ROC-NY joined a growing worker center
51. ROC-NY members were also key participants in the "$5.15 is Not Enough" Coalition
with the Working Families Party, which succeeded in raising the minimum wage in New York in
2004 in spite of a gubernatorial veto. See Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York,
Programs-Policy Work, http://rocny.org/programs-policywork.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2007).
52. See ROC-NY, Proposed Responsible Restaurant Licensing Bill (Jan. 2007) (on file
with author); BEHIND THE KITCHEN DOOR, supra note 7. See generally ROC-NY, Programs-
Research Work, http://rocny.org/programs-researchwork.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2007).
53. See Steven Greenhouse, In $8 Billion Restaurant Industry, a Study Finds Mostly 'Bad
Jobs', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2005, at B7. See also Leslie Casimir, Say Minorities get Worst Eatery
Jobs, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 25, 2005, at 9.
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movement in the U.S., composed of community-based non-profit organizations
that pursued localized economic justice campaigns outside the legal framework
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).54 Worker centers cropped up at
the margins of the workforce, vastly dwarfed by the financial and political
power, and legal standing of the unions. Organizers and workers came together
in some cases in explicit opposition to unions-which remained officially anti-
immigrant through the 1990s55-and in other cases to fill the empty space left
by an institution in decline and under attack by employers and the state. Many
worker centers harnessed cultural and ethnic solidarity within immigrant
communities 56  to propel campaigns for social and economic justice.
Organizers, without the institutional standing and outside of the regulatory
framework limiting unions,57 adopted more confrontational direct action tactics
against employers, including public demonstrations and media advocacy
targeted at customers and neutral suppliers and buyers.5 8 Additionally, worker
centers were unafraid to engage in intra-community campaigns, challenging
54. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000); JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING
COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM (2006); Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker
Representation in the United States: Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 385 (2005).
Boaventura de Sousa Santos notes the turn in the global North from working class parties and
labor unions toward a plurality of modes of organization and methodologies with social
transformative goals. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Neoliberal Governance: The World
Social Forum as Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics and Legality, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION
FROM BELOW 29,43 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Crsar A. Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2005).
55. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1767,
1775, 1828-29 (2001); Jim Pope, Next Wave Organizing and the Shift to a New Paradigm of
Labor Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 515, 533 (2005-06); The pro-immigrant stance of organized
labor coincided with the election of John Sweeney in 1995. Peter T. Kilbom, Why Labor Wants
The Tired and Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1995, at E3. Unions are now actively seeking
immigrant members, directly and through immigrant organizations. See also Stephen Franklin,
Farm union helps in recruiting and hiring immigrant workers, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 19, 2006, §
Business, at 3; Steven Greenhouse, Labor Federation Forms a Pact with Day Workers, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2006, at A18.
56. See Fine, supra note 54, at 5 (indicating that the worker center classification includes a
range of organizations, including those serving African-Americans, mixed immigrant and non-
immigrant populations, and workfare recipients but that the vast majority of the organizations
serve immigrant communities).
57. See Julie Yates Rivchin, Building Power Among Low-Wage Immigrant Workers: Some
Legal Considerations for Organizing Structures and Strategies, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 397, 410-16 (2004) ("[T]he [NLRA]'s strict regulation of organizing tactics may present
difficulties for a workers' center, and even undermine the ability of a campaign to meet the
center's overall goals. The NLRA prohibits secondary boycotts under most circumstances, places
restrictions on picketing, and also limits the way in which racial issues can be addressed in union
certification election campaigns." Id. at 410 (citations omitted)).
58. Congress, the courts, and the NLRB have sought to regulate labor organizations'
secondary boycott, see 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(B) (prohibiting union actions against third parties),
and picketing activities. See also Int'l Hod Carriers Local 840, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962)
(interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) as placing restrictions on the time and purpose of pickets).
Worker centers have successfully evaded the labor organization classification, and the
corresponding legal limits placed on their campaign tactics, through effective defensive advocacy
before the NLRB. See infra note 129.
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immigrant employers who used race (or skin color), class, and caste-based
hierarchies to keep workers in line. 59 Over time, unions adopted some of the
workplace and community organizing methodologies of worker centers, as well
as their emphasis on organizing immigrant workers and their use of
confrontational tactics against employers, especially the unions that form the
new Change to Win coalition. 60 Worker centers have been innovative at the
margins of the field, outside of the bureaucratic strictures and biases of unions
and the regulatory regime established by business and government to contain
labor organizing.
Law school clinics were among the first legal organizations to collaborate
with worker centers. 6 1 In New York, the clinic in which I work-the City
University of New York School of Law Immigrant and Refugee Rights Clinic
(CUNY-IRRC)-has been engaged by worker centers such as Andolan
Organizing South Asian Workers,62 Domestic Workers United,63 ROC-NY,
59. The white male leadership of most unions through the 1990s downplayed race and
gender-based concerns within the movement and at worksites. See Pope, supra note 56, at 530
("Most union officials shied away from alliances with social movements like the civil rights
movement and the women's movement, viewing them as threats both to the stability of collective
bargaining relationships and to their own job security as aging white men at the helm of
increasingly diverse and female organizations." Id. (citation omitted)). This stance together with
the antipathy held by unions against immigrants, ensured that worker centers, such as Chinese
Staff and Workers Association and Andolan Organizing South Asian Workers, would lead the
fight against intra-community racism, classism, and caste-ism.
60. For background on Change to Win campaigns, see, e.g., William Glanz, Union Targets
Janitors for Organizing, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006 at CIO; Jim Newton, Hotel Campaign
Signals Labor's Ascent in L.A., L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2006, at 1.
61. The model of providing worker centers with outside legal counsel on federal litigation
through clinical legal education was originated by Michael J. Wishnie and Nancy Morawetz, law
professors and co-directors of the NYU School of Law Immigrant Rights Clinic (NYU-IRC), in
early collaborations with Chinese Staff and Workers Association, National Mobilization Against
Sweatshops, and Andolan. See also infra note 63.
62. Andolan, which means "movement" in several South Asian languages, is a community
group of low-wage immigrant South Asian workers. Andolan seeks to empower its members by
educating them about their workplace rights, advocating for living wages, raising public
awareness surrounding abusive industry conditions--particularly in the areas of domestic,
restaurant, and retail work, and litigating against exploitative employers. See Andolan, About Us,
http://andolan.netlabout-us.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2007). See also Albor Ruiz, Battling Diplo
Abuse of Workers in Homes, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Oct. 7, 2004, at 4 (highlighting Andolan's
campaign against diplomatic immunity, which shields diplomats from prosecution when they
employ housekeepers and nannies and violate labor laws).
63. Domestic Workers United (DWU) represents members in an industry that includes
more than 600,000 women in the greater New York Metropolitan area. DWU was founded by
workers and organizers with the Women Workers Project of Committee Against Anti-Asian
Violence. DWU engages in a variety of organizing and lobbying activities, including recent efforts
to promulgate a standard domestic worker contract throughout New York that would provide for a
living wage and dignified employment. See Chisun Lee, Domestic Disturbance, VILLAGE VOICE,
Mar. 19, 2002, at 31-32, 35 (profiling DWU's attempts to organize domestic workers during
recent rights awareness campaign); Ai-jen Poo & Eric Tang, Center Stage: Domestic Workers
Organizing in the Global City, in THE NEW URBAN IMMIGRANT WORKFORCE 105-18, supra note
8; DWU Homepage, http://www.domesticworkersunited.org/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2007).
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New York Taxi Workers Alliance, 64 and the Workplace Project in campaigns
against exploitative conditions of work. Organizers enjoy working with law
school clinics because students bring a high level of energy, focus, and
progressive political commitments to the work. I have found that most
collaborations with worker centers have significantly advanced my learning
goals with students: (1) building a knowledge base in a substantive area of
law; 65 (2) developing students' capability to define their role between the
parameters set out in the rules of professional responsibility and the needs
presented by the clients and organizers with whom we work; and (3) preparing
students for contemporary public interest practice, including strategic campaign
development and media and policy advocacy.66 Overall, these collaborations
have benefited all parties involved and the students have experience early in
their careers with some of the complexities of the use of law to advance the
interests of poor people.
3. Worker Centers and Lawyers
Organizers, and the public interest lawyers with whom they work, view
the use of law to advance collective action and social change with ambivalence
and sometimes even hostility. 67 Worker centers' use of lawyers has been
conditional and experimental, partly due to this shared skepticism about how
law might undermine collective action, and it is therefore difficult to generalize
about a single model of collaboration. For example, when organizers observed
64. The Taxi Workers' Alliance was founded in 1998 when it coordinated a massive
40,000 driver strike in New York City. See BiJu MATHEW, TAXI!: CABS AND CAPITALISM IN NEW
YORK CITY (2005); Somini Sengupta, Deploring Giuliani Proposals, Cabbies Shun Fares for a
Day, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1998, at Al; Hilary Russ, Making Change: Organizing Drivers, CITY
LIMITS MAGAZINE, July-Aug., 2002, available at
http://www.citylimits.org/contentlarticles/viewarticle.cfin?articleid=2787 (last visited Aug. 15,
2007). Currently, the Alliance represents approximately 6,000 membcrs and works to promote
economic and civil rights for taxi drivers. In 2004, the Alliance successfully lobbied the NYC
Taxi and Limousine Commission to increase taxi fares by 26%. See Michael Luo, Taxi
Commission Backs a 26% Rise for Fares in City, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at Al. The alliance
is currently involved in a campaign to block the installation of GPS trackers in all NYC taxi cabs.
See Pete Donohue, DOI To Delay launch of Space Age Cabs, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 20, 2006,
at 3. The alliance was invited to join the New York City Central Labor Council in 2006. See
Steven Greenhouse, Taxi Workers'Alliance May Join Labor Group, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006,
at B3.
65. Wage and hour law is quite accessible to law students and relatively uncomplicated at
its core. Further, the cases have allowed students to gain incremental proficiency in more
challenging parts of the field, such as anti-discrimination law and the intersection of employment
and immigration law.
66. There is much more to say on the benefits and challenges of these collaborations for
clinical legal education and the development of public interest law and these arguments are partly
the focus of my other scholarly work.
67. See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, After Public Interest Law, 100 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1251, 1277-81 (2006); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law
and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 443, 450-60 (2001).
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that lawyers and individual legal action take workers' attention away from
larger campaigns, the relationship is altered in both current and future
campaigns.
Filings, reports, and studies of worker centers indirectly reveal the wide
range of lawyering activities nested, to varying degrees, within larger
organizing strategies. These activities can be roughly classified into three
categories of legal work: claim-centered, organizing-centered, and policy
advocacy-centered. Lawyers did claim-centered work-legal advocacy with the
aim of winning damages for individual or groups of workers who worked under
unlawful conditions-in the earliest collaborations with worker centers and
continue to do so with great success. Increasingly, lawyers have done
organizing-centered work-legal advocacy to promote and defend workplace
organizing and the tactical use of direct action protests against target
employers-as worker centers have undertaken more ambitious campaigns
with more sophisticated adversaries. Lawyers continue to engage in policy
advocacy-centered work-legal analysis, drafting of reports and petitions, and
lobbying to government agencies and elected officials-both at the behest of,
and independent of, worker centers. The following examples are meant to
illustrate rather than provide an exhaustive survey of the field: 68
(a) Claim-centered legal work
Heightened awareness of degraded working conditions and the
creative use of law to drive direct action and media campaigns by
worker centers led to the revived enforcement of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA)69 and state wage and hour laws. Numerous
worker centers collaborated with lawyers to bring wage and hour
actions on behalf of their members in federal, state, and local
courts.
Attorneys at the Asian American Legal Defense and Education
Fund (AALDEF), working with the Chinese Staff and Workers
Association (CSWA)70 in New York, and the Asian Pacific
American Legal Center, working with the Garment Worker
Center 71 in Los Angeles, successfully litigated to expand
68. Please note that this is a partial list and does not reflect all of the dedicated attorneys
and organizations working to protect the rights of immigrant workers.
69. See 29 U.S.C. §201 etseq.
70. See generally Peter Kwong, Chinese Staff and Workers' Association: A Model for
Organizing in the Changing Economy?, 25 Soc. POL'y 30 (1994). See also Steven Greenhouse,
Lawsuit Accuses Fashion House of Running Sweatshops, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2000, at B10,
(CSWA organized with the named plaintiffs to bring a class action lawsuit filed by AALDEF
against Donna Karan); Andrew Hsiao, 100 Years of Hell-Raising: the Hidden History of Asian
American Activism in New York City, VILLAGE VOICE, June 23, 1998, at 67 (CSWA instigated
demonstrations against Street Beat, a sportswear company, in conjunction with a lawsuit filed by
AALDEF).
71. See Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies of
the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 471-81 (2005-06).
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manufacturers' liability for wage and hour violations by
subcontractors in the garment industry.
Lawyers, especially staff attorneys at the Legal Aid Society-
Employment Law Center of San Francisco (LAS-ELC), limited
the scope of the application of the 2002 Hoffman Plastic
decision.7 2 There have been parallel efforts to limit the
applicability of Hoffman in the context of employment
discrimination cases.
73
(b) Organizing-centered legal work
Lawyers filed Unfair Labor Practice charges pursuant to the
NLRA against employers engaged in retaliatory actions against
workers participating in worker center campaigns. Lawyers also
attempted to defend nascent independent union organizing drives
under the NLRA.
First Amendment attorneys at the New York Civil Liberties Union
and from several private law firms defended the rights of worker
centers to engage in public demonstrations and also defended
defamation actions using state provisions prohibiting "strategic
lawsuits against public participation," or Strategic Lawsuit Against
Public Participation (SLAPP) suits. 7
Lawyers and law students at CUNY-IRRC participated in "know
your rights" programs with immigrants to help them enforce their
own rights through negotiations with employers and pro se actions
in small claims court.
Lawyers at the MALDEF and the American Civil Liberties Union
72. See Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R.'s Oil, Inc., 214 F.Supp.2d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(plaintiff represented by LAS-ELC, National Immigration Law Center, and pro bono attorneys
from Brobeck, Bribeck, Phleger & Harrison, LLP; Hoffman Plastic does not bar undocumented
immigrants from recovering back pay for work already performed); Christopher Ho & Jennifer C.
Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic Compound, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for
Protecting Undocumented Workers in the Title VII Context and Beyond, 22 HoFsTRA LAB. & EMp.
L. J. 473,496 (2005) (discussing cases that limit the Hoffinan Plastic holding in context of FLSA,
Workers' Compensation, and tort cases). See also Flores v. Amigon, 233 F.Supp.2d 462
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (plaintiff represented by Urban Justice Center and civil rights firm Koob &
Magoolaghan); Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F.Supp.2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (plaintiff
represented by AALDEF & employment firm Outten & Golden).
73. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.2d 1057, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied,
384 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 905 (2005) (LAS-ELC represented plaintiffs
and NELP and National Employment Lawyers Association submitted amicus briefs; discovery of
immigration status would chill immigrant workers' exercise of legitimate right to remedies under
Title VII); Ho & Chang, supra note 72, at 497-517 (discussing Title VII cases interpreting
Hoffman Plastic and legal theories to limit its holding).
74. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211, 3212 (McKinney 2007); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 70-a, 76-a
(McKinney 2007).
75. We have partnered with the Latin American Workers Project in Brooklyn and the
Queens Community House ESL program in Jackson Heights, New York.
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(ACLU) litigated on behalf of the National Day Laborer
Organizing Network against anti-solicitation and anti-loitering
laws in numerous localities. 6
(c) Policy advocacy-centered legal work
Attorneys at organizations such as the National Employment Law
Project (NELP) and the National Immigration Law Center (NILC)
led impact litigation (both affirmative and defensive, in the
instance of Hoffman Plastic and the cases that have followed) and
policy-making initiatives. Additionally, they documented the
activities of worker centers and the impact of legal changes on
immigrants.
77
Attorneys and law students with NYU-IRC and CUNY-IRRC
served as legislative counsel to worker centers such as Domestic
Workers United 78 and ROC-NY, respectively.
Attorneys at NELP, 79 ACLU,80 NYU-IRC, 8' and a student labor
76. See Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies of
the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 487-95 (2005-06).
77. See, e.g., NELP, Holding the Wage Floor: Enforcement of Wage and Hour Standards
for Low-Wage Workers in an Era of Government Inaction and Employer Unaccountability (2006),
http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/Holding%20the%20Wage%2OFloor2%2Epdf (last visited Aug.
15, 2007) (providing data on violations common to specific industries and suggesting
recommendations for legislative and organizing campaigns); NELP, Analysis of Certain Key
provisions of HR 4437 (Sensenbrenner-King) Impacting Worker Centers (2006),
http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/analysis%20oP/20certain%20key/o2Oprovisions%2Epdf (last
visited Aug. 15, 2007) (highlighting an expanded definition of smuggling and preemption of state
and local laws designed to support day labor centers among other provisions). See generally
NELP, Immigrant Worker Project, http://www.immigrant-
nonstandard.org/page.php?section=immigrant&page=index (last visited Aug. 15, 2007); NILC
Immigrants & Employment Index, http://www.nilc.orglimmsemplymnt/index.htn (last visited
Aug. 15, 2007) (including a Hoffman amicus curiae brief and resource material for immigrant
workers, organizers, and legal advocates).
78. NYU-IRC provided legislative counsel to DWU on a new municipal law that
strengthened local regulation of employment agencies for nannies. See Steven Greenhouse, New
Protections for Nannies are Approved by Council, N.Y.TMES, May 15, 2003, at B3.
79. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IAC) OC-18 (2003), translated excerpt of
decision available at http://www.immigrant-
nonstandard.org/page.phpsection=immigrant&page=human-rights-translated (last visited Aug.
15, 2007) (amicus brief filed by NELP, Professor Sarah Cleveland of University of Texas School
of Law, Professor Beth Lyon of Villanova University School of Law, NILC, and Northwest
Worker Justice Center; case brought by Mexico against U.S. in reaction to the Supreme Court
holding in Hoffman Plastic and the consequent limits on rights of immigrant workers in U.S.).
80. See Petition Alleging Violations of the Human Rights of Undocumented Workers by
the U.S. (Nov. 1, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/images/asset-upload file946_27232.pdf
(last visited Aug. 15, 2007) (filed with IAC by ACLU, University of Pennsylvania Transnational
Legal Clinic, and NELP on behalf of immigrant workers pursuant to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights).
81. See Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrant Workers and the Domestic Enforcement of
International Labor Rights, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 529, 543-57 (2002); Mexico NAO No. 01-
01 (Feb. 2002) (petition filed pursuant to North American Agreement for Labor Cooperation
20071 1897
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
rights organization at Yale Law School 82 collaborated on petitions
with worker centers on behalf of workers before international
organizations, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
and tribunals created under procedures set out in trade-based
treaties, such as the labor side agreement to the North American
Free Trade Agreement. 83  These attorneys also litigated
international law claims on behalf of immigrant workers in
domestic courts through the Alien Tort Claims Act.
8 4
The collaborations produced particular dynamics in the tripartite
relationship between organizers, workers, and attorneys with varying levels of
associated collective action, client empowerment, and lawyer accountability.
8 5
In some cases, lawyers developed strategies pursued by worker centers. In
other cases, organizers and workers led the way. Worker centers employed
lawyers both affirmatively and defensively. Nearly all of the lawyers involved
in the early collaborations with worker centers were public interest lawyers,
employed by non-profit organizations or associated with law school clinics.
8 6
B. The Lawyers
After organizers are approached by individuals or groups of workers with
[NAALC] by CSWA and National Mobilization Against Sweatshops [NMASS] against New York
State Workers' Compensation Board due to delays in the adjudication of injured workers' claims).
82. See Mexico NAO No. 9804 (1998), Canada NAO No. 9802 (1998) (petitions filed
pursuant to the NAALC by workers' rights coalition against the collaboration between U.S.
immigration and labor enforcement agencies).
83. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to
Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 1024-25 (1995) (critique of cross-
border monitoring approach used in NAALC). The International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF),
which collaborates extensively with organized labor, and Professor Lance Compa of the Cornell
School of Industrial and Labor Relations were important progenitors of the use of international
law and tribunals on behalf of U.S. workers. See generally Lance Compa, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE:
WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE U.S. UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS (2004); ILRF campaign materials, available at www.laborrights.org (last visited Aug.
15, 2007).
84. See Wishnie, supra note 81, at 538-43.
85. These categories are derived from the analysis set out by Cummings and Eagly, see
supra note 67, After Public Interest Law at 1268-82.
86. This is changing as more private law firms become involved in class action wage and
hour litigation. E.g., Outten & Golden, Shelly's New York/Fireman Hospitality Group Withheld
Tips, Minimum Wages, and Overtime Case, http://www.outtengolden.com/firm/practice/class-
actions/#225 (last visited Aug. 15, 2007) (Outten & Golden and co-counsel AALDEF are
currently representing worker-members of ROC-NY in a class action against an upscale Midtown
Manhattan restaurant); Leiff Cabraser, Practice Areas: Employment Law,
http://www.lieffcabraser.com/practice-areas.htm#employment (last visited Dec. 26, 2006)
(describing 2002 case in which the firm represented assembly line workers at Perdue Farms
chicken plants and settled for $10 million). However, public interest lawyers will remain attorneys
of first resort for worker centers for reasons set out in Section III.B, infra (noting willingness of




grievances that advance the larger organizational goals, formulate a campaign,
and develop the legal components of the planned initiative, they survey the
landscape and usually scramble to identify effective and politically progressive
lawyers with whom to collaborate. I highlight the identity and commitments of
members of the legal team in the ROC-NY campaign, the broader landscape of
public interest law in which organizers recruit lawyers, and the legal constraints
under which the campaign operated to further develop an understanding of the
collaboration between organizers, workers, and lawyers in this instance.
1. Clinic as Lawyer
In August 2003, ROC-NY approached CUNY-IRRC about joining the
campaign and representing the workers from the corporate restaurant chain in a
wage and hour action. The employment law landscape at public interest legal
organizations was fairly limited at that time. PRLDEF and AALDEF had
individual attorneys focused on employment matters. However, the Legal Aid
Society of New York (the largest provider of legal services to the poor in the
city), the New York Legal Assistance Group, and Legal Services of New York
(a provider with offices throughout the city) had yet to start employment law
units. NELP was involved in a large grocery delivery workers case and national
support activities (discussed above), but could not offer individual
representation for worker center campaigns. ROC-NY confronted a limited
choice of legal counsel in part because of federal prohibition on funding for
legal services for undocumented immigrants and for any kind of litigation other
than direct service provisions to individual clients. 87 The strategic and triaged
focus of legal services on benefits issues for the very poor, rather than
employment law matters for the working poor, exasperated the prohibition on
funding for legal services. 88 NELP and NILC were in the midst of a
challenging reinvention from serving as back-up centers for legal services
offices to becoming independent, self-funded providers of legal services.
Additionally, the legal defense funds modeled on the formative NAACP-LDF
example focused on civil rights issues, such as employment discrimination and
school desegregation, before focusing more centrally on legal services for
immigrants and workers.
Although other state law schools were under pressure to abandon
confrontational legal advocacy that departed from individual direct service
provision, 89 and the Pataki and Giuliani administrations tried to curb the
87. See David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-
Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 220-26 (2003).
88. See Juliet M. Brodie, Post-Welfare Lawyering: Clinical Legal Education and a New
Poverty Law Agenda, 20 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 201, 225 (2006) (discussing the need to adapt
legal services for individuals pushed into the low-wage labor market by welfare reform).
89. See Luban, supra note 87, at 236-41.
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progressive bent of the CUNY School of Law, 90 administrators, faculty, and
students at CUNY Law as well as other progressive allies in New York
encouraged the clinics to engage in creative public interest advocacy. 91 CUNY-
IRRC included immigrant labor cases on its docket due to the efforts of former
Dean Kristen Booth Glen, who viewed organized labor as an important
stakeholder in a public law school, and the advocacy of the Labor Coalition,
which was comprised of students who worked within the labor and immigrant
rights movement prior to law school.
The students were the lead attorneys on this case. Although I helped them
prepare for performance moments in litigation, such as initial client interviews,
reviewed all of their work, and led discussions about our legal strategies, the
students developed primary relationships with the workers and organizers,
negotiated with opposing counsel, and spoke in court and to the NLRB. After
the clinic agreed to represent ROC-NY, three third-year clinic students92 began
interviewing workers and collecting documentation about their claims. 9a I note
their backgrounds here because it is relevant to their commitment to a cause
that is larger than the lawsuit or their own experience in the clinic. One of these
students had been an organizer with 1199 SEIU, the activist affiliate of the
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in New York, and had spent
time working on political solidarity campaigns in Central America. All three
students worked for law firms during the school year, one with workers'
compensation lawyers and the other two with the firm representing the local of
the Communication Workers of America (CWA). Two of the students were
White and one was Latina; two of the students were bilingual Spanish/English
speakers and one only spoke English. 94 Within the clinic, two other students
90. Conservative media outlets, such as the NEw YORK POST and the CITY JOURNAL (a
quarterly issue by the Manhattan Institute), regularly called on Governor Pataki, Mayor Giuliani,
and the CUNY Board of Trustees to shut down the law school in the last decade. See Heather Mac
Donald, CUNY Could Be Great Again, CITY JOURNAL, Winter 1998, available at http://www.city-
journal.orghtml/8lcuny-could.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2007) (CUNY Law is "irredeemably
rotten" with its "1960s-style curriculum in political organizing and consciousness-raising");
Editorial, Close CUNY Law School, N.Y. POST, January 19, 1999, at 28, CUNY Before the Bar,
N.Y. POST, Dec. 8, 2002, at 24; Editorial, The School We Don't Need, N.Y. POST, May 3, 2003, at
14.
91. See, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes from a Law
School Clinic, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 173, 189-96 (2001) (describing a collaboration between a
CUNY clinic and a grassroots organization of welfare recipients).
92. Students ranked the cases on which they wanted to work (in the CUNY-IRRC that year,
the choice was between asylum, Violence Against Women Act, and immigrant worker cases) and
they were assigned to teams on the basis of those preferences.
93. Emily Grajales, William Massey, Johnda Powers, and, later, Jesse Gribben constituted
the first student team from CUNY-IRRC to work on this case and draft the complaint.
94. Hollis Pfitsch, Sebastion Riccardi, and Greg Sharma-Holt constituted the second team
and negotiated the settlement agreement. This team was composed of a student with a background
in organized labor, another who had worked with immigrant workers at a non-profit in the
Northwest prior to law school, and a third student who had worked with ACORN.
1900 [Vol. 95:1879
LA WYERS AND RESISTANCE
worked on a new wage and hour case with five worker-members of a nascent
worker center at Asociaci6n Tepeyac-a social services organization composed
of Mexican-Christian congregations in New York City and led by a priest
featured in numerous news reports discussing the loss of undocumented people
at the World Trade Center on 9/1l1.95 That case, also on behalf of restaurant
workers, was filed in state court in December and settled shortly thereafter. One
of those students also had a background as a labor organizer prior to law
school, and joined the team working on the ROC-NY case as it moved into
discovery. All four students on the case in that academic year understood why
the clinic was engaged in this collaboration with ROC-NY. The students with
labor backgrounds recognized that the litigation would advance the campaign
to improve the conditions of work at a prime target restaurant in the high-end
segment of the industry, rather than viewing the campaign as adjunct to the
litigation. One student, who had a part-time job with a workers' compensation
firm, was won over by the emphasis on collective action after attending her first
protest in front of the restaurant. This student buy-in was an essential element
of the collaboration's success, the result of their prior political commitments
and the public interest-oriented environment of CUNY Law. The students
worked relentlessly on the case against a big law firm.
As a first step, students drafted memoranda on the applicable legal
framework and possible claims under FLSA, New York wage and hour law,
96
common-law tort and contract claims, and the National Labor Relations Act.
The three-student team started a grueling schedule of interviews with the
sixteen workers who participated in the ROC-NY campaign against their
employer. These interviews took place before and after the weekly meeting of
the workers' committee at the organization, often simultaneously in multiple
rooms, with the English-only speaker either focused solely on the English-
speaking workers or working in tandem with a ROC-NY interpreter. The team
synthesized the evidence gleaned from interviews and studied the workers'
documents, including piles of pay stubs dating back up to ten years and copies
of weekly time schedules substantiating workers' names and assigned shifts.
On the basis of this partial factual record, the team calculated unpaid wages
over the duration of each worker's employment. Their analysis demonstrated
that while the workers consistently worked eight to ten hours per shift, they
only received pay for a seven-hour shift. The students determined that the
workers could recover for unpaid overtime pay under federal and state statutory
claims and for unpaid straight-time wages under common-law contract claims.
Though we could not fully substantiate a racial discrimination claim in this suit,
we learned that the head chef at the restaurant allegedly called the workers
95. See, e.g., Edward Lewine, Making Mexicans His Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1998, at
14-1.
96. See N.Y. LAB. LAw §§ 650-665; 12 NYCRR 142.
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"stupid Mexicans" and arbitrarily threatened their jobs.
The students estimated that unpaid wages and corresponding liquidated
damages totaled approximately $360,000. The consistency of underpayment of
a few hours of wages every day for each worker (a seemingly informal system
used by the bosses to exploit their least-paid employees and maximize
corporate profits) gave us confidence we could prove these wage violations.
We were unsure if a court would award our clients the entirety of liquidated
damages to which they were untitled under state and federal law. The
employer's systemic violations seemed an indication of a lack of good faith
(the standard for liquidated damages under the federal statute), though we
understood that courts may hesitate in awarding non-wage income to workers.
Because we did not deem that punitive damages for our less central tort claims
held much promise for our clients at trial and because these damages were
indeterminate, we did not include them in our initial estimate. The team also
researched the employer's corporate structure and identified the parent
corporation and its officers, who were then named as joint defendants with the
lower-level managers in the restaurant. The students developed a unified
factual narrative that described the conditions for all of the back-of-the-house
workers at the restaurant, as well as individual factual narratives for each
worker in the suit. At the end of this initial phase of interviewing, legal
analysis, and narrative development, the team filed a thirty-page complaint
against the employer with five claims in federal district court.
2. The Promise of Law-Legal Underpinnings of the ROC-NY Litigation
To a certain extent, the law offered the workers relief that justified a
litigation strategy in the campaign. The lawsuit underpinning the campaign in
the ROC-NY case study stemmed from violations of four sets of laws: FLSA,
New York State wage and hour law, state contract and tort common law, and
the NLRA. Additionally, two governmental agencies became implicated in the
campaign, the U.S. Department of Labor (U.S. DOL) and the NLRB. Together,
these laws and agencies (and a few others not implicated in the campaign such
as the state labor enforcement agency and federal and state health and safety
regulations) form the web of legal protection offered by the state to low-wage
workers, including immigrants. Congress passed FLSA in 1938, setting a floor
for wages and a ceiling on hours for non-unionized workers.9 7 The statute
97. See 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The statute also included prohibitions on child labor and
retaliation by employers against employees who complain of violations. FLSA specifically
excluded agricultural and domestic labor, largely as a result of compromise with senators from the
South where African-Americans constituted the vast majority of workers in these sectors. See also
Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a Reconstructed Civil
Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 981, 1041-43 (2002) (discussing historical exclusions and
limitations of FLSA in light of its grounding in the Commerce Clause rather than the anti-slavery
Reconstruction Amendments); Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act:
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delegated enforcement authority to U.S. DOL but also provided for a private
right of action in federal courts; there was no administrative exhaustion
requirement. 98 New York State designated the state Department of Labor and
the N.Y. Attorney General's office to enforce its wage and hour law. Currently,
New York State requires employers pay a higher minimum wage than that
required under FLSA.99 Both the federal and state statutory wage and hour
scheme stem from common-law contract and tort law, including breach and
unjust enrichment, though the statutory schemes do not preempt common-law
claims. The NLRA passed for the protection of workplace campaigns for
collective bargaining, followed by the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Act
passed at the behest of employers.' 00 A number of legal academic
commentators indicate that the pro-labor provisions of the NLRA are rendered
ineffective by interpretations of the Act by the court.10 1 Additionally,
commentators note the overall ineffectiveness of the administrative agencies
charged with enforcing labor laws. 10 2 These critiques have shaped the
advocacy strategies used by workers centers and lawyers.
Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1335, 1371-80 (1987) (discussing FLSA
legislative history).
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 216.
99. The minimum wage in New York is $7.15 as of January 1, 2007. See N.Y. LAB. LAw §
652.
100. See generally Steven E. Abraham, How the Taft-Hartley Act Hindered Unions, 12
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1994); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1533-34 (2002); Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?,
47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763 (1998).
101 . See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1379, 1412-30 (1993); Michael C. Harper, The Case
for Limiting Judicial Review of Labor Board Certification Decisions, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
262, 298 & n. 163 (1987); James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the
Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1575-1580, 1588-1591 (1996) (summarizing Supreme Court
decisions which restricted the collective bargaining process-particularly after 1970, and
theorizing the Court's refusal to adhere to NLRA policy); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization
of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV.
265, 291-93 (1978).
102. E.g., Marc Linder, Closing the Gap Between Reich and Poor: Which Side is the
Department of Labor On?, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1993) (criticizing the DOL's
regulatory definition of FLSA's salary test). See also Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for
Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 457, 531-33
(1992) (summarizing the problems of agency enforcement of labor laws, including Title VII,
NLRA, FLSA, OSHA, and Workers Compensation); Id. at 545-46 ("Government agencies are too
often hobbled by budget limitations and too vulnerable to political appointees who are
unsympathetic to the substantive rights meant to be protected."). There are approximately eighty
million workers covered by FLSA, and only 946 DOL investigators; federal enforcement alone is
not enough to enforce FLSA to the fullest extent possible. Brief for the Secretary of Labor as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Bailey v. Gulf Coast Transp., Inc. 280 F.3d 1333 (11 th Cir.
2001) (No. 01-12379), available at http://www.dol.gov/sol/media/briefsbaileyvgulfcoast(A)-6-
10-2002.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2007) (supporting a private right of action for FLSA's anti-
retaliation provision). See also Bernhardt & McGrath, supra note 20.
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3. The Limits of Law - Undermining Collective Action
Apart from the specific critiques of labor law and enforcement agencies,
many commentators, in and out of the academy, make a broader critique of the
atomistic nature of remedies offered by public interest lawyers. The sustained
"internal" progressive critique 10 3 has spurred marked shifts in practice, as have
the theoretical critiques emanating from the legal academy. Impact litigation
and legal services strategies were built on a foundational commitment to rights
and "rights talk," which gained importance in public interest lawyering as a
result of the expansive interpretations of rights offered by the Warren Court and
successive legislative victories in the areas of employment discrimination, fair
housing, and voting rights. Critical legal scholars, such as Duncan Kennedy and
Roberto Unger, spearheaded a critique of adjudication and questioned its
centrality in the construction of social systems. 104 Building on the work of legal
realists, they argued that all legal arguments are reducible to policy arguments,
including both legal and normative-rights reasoning.'0 5 Thus, lay-rights
discourse, or "rights talk," slipped into politically-contingent indeterminate
balancing. 106 In light of the inherent indeterminacy of legal reasoning, using
adjudication to define and resolve social and economic disputes by left lawyers
had the effect of legitimizing and reinforcing an established political
structure, 107 the same structure constructed for managing and oppressing poor
people. The dependence of public interest lawyers on rights-strategies was also
dangerous because the judiciary would turn against less powerful segments of
the populations, such as poor people, when the underlying politics turned
against those populations.10 8 Mark Tushnet argued that legal victories and
losses endangered progress in the political realm and that rejected rights claims
would drop out of the political sphere.'°9 Political scientist Stuart Scheingold,
103. The conservative critique of public interest law is well known and well documented
(even as right-wing movements have entered the arena of impact litigation for social change). See
generally Luban, supra note 87.
104. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE)
(1997); Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 567-76
(1983) (setting forth critiques of objectivism and formalism in legal thought and process).
105. See Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT
LEGALISM, supra note 2, at 196-97.
106. See id. at 212.
107. See Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1581-86 (1984) ("[E]xisting rights-thinking attributes a
'falsely concrete' or frozen character to what are always contingent or merely possible social
phenomena." Id. at 1581).
108. The welfare rights movement suffered through this political dynamic, in which
advocates successfully used judicial action to create a right to due process when the government
attempted to end subsistence payments to poor people, Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970),
which process was later proscribed by efficiency concerns when the progressive moment passed in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
109. See Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23, 27-29 (1993). But see
Scott Barclay & Shauna Fisher, Cause Lawyers in the First Wave Same Sex Marriage Litigation,
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laid the basis for this critique with his work The Politics of Rights in which he
drew on case studies of legal reform movements to conclude that the
dependence of progressive movements on incremental rights-based strategies
would imperil more fundamental political shifts achievable through collective
action.110 Critical labor scholars have focused on the negative impact of
individualized rights claims on collective organizing strategies in the
workplace."'1 Twenty-five years of multi-pronged and powerful criticism
directed at legal rights based strategies convinced many public interest lawyers
that such strategies were politically contingent, imperiled long-term success,
and preempted collective action.'12
Out of the critique of rights evolved the critique of litigation. The poverty
lawyering literature of the 1980s and early 1990s related stories of individual
resistance in remote forums, such as the local legal services office or the
individual welfare hearing." 3 These narratives were presented as evidence of a
in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 84-100 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, eds.
2006) (discussing the positive effects on a grassroots movement of an unsuccessful litigation
strategy).
110. See STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND
POLITICAL CHANGE (1974). Gerald Rosenberg made a similar critique from a different political
position and argued that the legalization of political movements has ultimately disserved political
movements and impaired legal institutions. See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
I ll. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The
Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System,
59 U. CHIC. REV. L. 575, 638 (1992).
112. It is important to note that critical legal scholars were centrally focused on the
advancement of left causes within and outside the legal academy and the debate was, on an
underlying theoretical level, about strategy and tactics rather than goals. Some scholars
incorporated the insights of the critical legal scholars in their work while arguing for continued
engagement in concrete projects for social justice. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic
of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986)
(documenting the interrelationship between rights and politics from experience in a particular
social movement); Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social
Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509
(1984) (challenging critical legal scholars to reconnect their doctrinal analysis to progressive
social movements).
113. Two scholars who skillfully deployed client narratives to facilitate theoretical
interventions into public interest practice were Gerald Lopez and Lucie White. In REBELLIOUS
LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1989), Lopez criticized
lawyers representing poor communities for undercutting community leadership and minimizing
lay knowledge. See generally GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S
VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1989). Lawyers in poor communities set out to do good,
but as a result of their own race and class assumptions and the dominant assumptions of the legal
profession, their work only exacerbates the conditions of powerlessness felt by their clients. Lopez
effectively brought Derrick Bell's race and class critique of the Brown v. Board of Education
impact litigation strategy to frontline legal services offices. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two
Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J.
470 (1976). Lopez developed a set of tactical changes that could transform poverty lawyering and
advance a community empowerment agenda with a foundation in lay lawyering and leadership.
Meanwhile, White internalized critical legal scholarship and applied the insights of feminist
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new kind of resistance strategy, in which clients reversed the traditional power
dynamic and led lawyers in advocacy efforts on the basis of their knowledge,
dignity, and courage."14 The central moving force in narratives of poverty
lawyering was no longer that of idealistic lawyers of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund who entered Southern courthouses and racked up
legal victories. 115 These figures were replaced by clever and courageous clients
and organizers who out-maneuvered agency personnel, lawyers, and judges,
often in spite of their own attorney's inaction or mistaken strategic choices, l6
The underlying theory (or implication) of social change was that poor people
could transform communities and entrenched legal systems through their
assertions of power against bureaucrats and lawyers. The themes of the legal
academic literature were manifested in the field by a move away from
professionalism to "lay lawyering" T17-poverty lawyers and community
advocates less focused on litigation and law reform as a means of redress and
instead oriented toward participation in local, non-legal efforts for social
change. It also signaled a departure from formal legal norms to softer informal
theory and postmodern political and literary thought in her analysis of selected case studies. Such
cases include an African-American woman who speaks truth to power in her welfare hearing, see
Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990), or the plaintiff class in a welfare suit that used
speak-outs and the homeless people who used street theater to build community. See Lucie E.
White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 546-63 (1987-88). See also Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building
Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 369 (1983). These legal academic interventions had a sustained and widespread
impact on public interest law, from impact litigation to frontline legal services offices, both
directly through the work itself and indirectly through the internalization of their insights by law
students filtering into varied practice settings. See generally Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating
Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427 (2000) (analyzing the theoretical insights of
Lopez, White, and Anthony V. Alfieri, refuting critiques, and surveying applications of the work).
However, the impact was also uneven, as the extension and application of the ideas and the
implementation of innovative tactics and strategies were left to a wide range of practitioners. It
cannot be said that lawyering is no longer "regnant." It seems predestined that there will always be
regnant lawyers who pursue established modes of practice and rebellious lawyers who deliver
legal services in new forms to more effectively achieve social justice ends. In considering
innovative approaches to public interest law in the current context, it is essential to understand the
pervasive influence of these scholars on the evolution of practice over the last two decades. See
Joel F, Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
697 (1992); Cummings & Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, supra note 67, at
456-60.
114. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).
115. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2004).
116. See White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes, supra note
113.
117. See Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extra-legal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness




"normativities,"1 18 through which it is assumed that nongovernmental
organizations, rather than the state, would generate norms that advance social
justice. Scholars emphasized extralegal activism rather than litigation or
legislative strategies and decisively rejected established narratives about the
centrality of the public interest lawyer in movements for social change. 19 This
significantly influenced the construction of the role of the public interest lawyer
and, for some, sowed doubts in the minds of public interest lawyers about their
own efficacy and nurtured the fear that they quell, rather than nurture,
collective action.
Adjudication and law reform, particularly in the area of immigrants'
rights, has only confirmed the suspicions of progressive activists about the
viability of law as an instrument for social justice. In the 2002 decision in
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 120 the Supreme Court found that
the NLRB could not impose its most effective penalties-reinstatement of
employees who terminated in retaliation for involvement in organizing as well
as lost wages for the time that they would have been employed absent the
retaliatory termination-against employers if the prevailing workers were
undocumented. 121 Although the Hoffman Plastic decision has been interpreted
narrowly by immigrant worker advocates and most governmental agencies and
courts, 122 the decision could alternatively be read to fit into the broader trend of
weakened statutory protection for vulnerable communities. 123 By denying a
118. See id. at 978-82 (discussing the perils of a retreat by progressives to the extralegal
sphere).
119. See Cummings and Eagly, supra note 67.
120. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (foreclosing the
NLRB from awarding backpay to undocumented workers).
121. See id.
122. See National Labor Relations Board, Procedures and Remedies for Discriminatees
Who May Be Undocumented Aliens after Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. (July 19, 2002),
http://www.nlrb.gov/gcmemo/gc02-06.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2007); Employment Standards
Administration Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor, Fact Sheet #48: Application
of U.S. Labor Laws to Immigrant Workers: Effect of Hoffman Plastic decision on laws enforced by
the Wage and Hour Division, http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/whd/whdfs48.htm (last
visited June 18, 2005) ("The Department's Wage and Hour Division will continue to enforce the
FLSA and MSPA without regard to whether an employee is documented or undocumented.
Enforcement of these laws is distinguishable from ordering back pay under the NLRA." Id.).
123. In the U.S. specifically, the Supreme Court has used a series of techniques to strip
private individuals of their ability to enforce civil rights laws, such as by expanding the scope of
sovereign immunity and the scope of compelled arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act,
while reducing the availability of implied rights of action and attorneys fees. See Pam Karlan,
Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183 (2003). Sylvia Law analyzed
the federalism "revolution" in Supreme Court jurisprudence and surveyed the negative impact on
workers and other vulnerable populations. See Sylvia Law, In the Name of Federalism: The
Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 367 (2002). In
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), the Court decided that individuals do not have a
private right of action for discriminatory disparate impact on the basis of race, ethnicity, or
national origin against recipients of federal funding under Title VI. The Buckhannon (2001) court
curtailed the private enforcement of civil rights statutes by imposing a narrow definition of
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particular remedy to undocumented workers, five justices of the Supreme Court
have weakened employment protections for "unauthorized workers," which
might force immigrant workers to rely on individual contractual arrangements
with their employers, rather than collective action or statutory protection.
124
The decision is part of a broader movement to take labor disputes out of the
public and collective sphere and put them into the realm of private law.
125
Employers gain greater power over workers when labor disputes are
individualized and the state remains on the sidelines.
In the ROC-NY campaign, we attempted to mobilize sometimes hostile
state power, both through adjudication and agency enforcement against the
employer. CUNY-IRRC brought the case on behalf of the ROC-NY worker-
members in federal court rather than state court because discovery guidelines
were more stringent, federal judges had lower caseloads since they try to move
cases off their dockets as quickly as possible, and federal magistrate judges
usually took charge of discovery and issued schedules and orders quite
expediently. 126 However, some federal judges resented having simple wage and
hour cases on their dockets, especially in the Southern District of New York. 1
27
Additionally, judges were averse to the direct action and media advocacy
methodologies used during the campaigns of which the litigation was a part,
"prevailing party" for the purpose of determining defendant's liability for plaintiff's attorneys'
fees. See Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human
Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001). In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), the Court denied a
private claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act against the State of Maine on the basis of state
sovereignty. Each of these cases narrows the range of civil rights litigation that may be brought by
private litigants.
124. See WILLIAM B. GOULD, INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION,
TRADE, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds., 2003) ("[The
Hoffman Plastic] ruling which creates an incentive for American employers to employ workers to
whom labor law protection is denied constitutes a compelling argument in favor of the proposition
that the West, and particularly the U.S., is not concerned with the plight of vulnerable immigrant
workers who hail from the poor nations but rather the interests of entrepreneurs within our
borders." Id. at 95).
125. See Marianne Staniunas, All Employees Are Equal, But Some Employees Are More
Equal Than Others, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMp. L. 393, 399-400 (2004) (noting that employers seek
out undocumented workers because of their inability to seek enforcement of statutory labor
protections). See generally Katherine Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90
YALE L.J. 1509 (1981) (arbitration has successfully removed labor disputes from the public
sphere, preventing the development of a more vigorous class consciousness in the labor
movement).
126. Additionally, and not of minor significance for a law school clinic, expedient
discovery advanced pedagogical goals in exposing the student team to pre-trial procedure during
the time that they were in the clinic. Michael J. Wishnie, Clinical Professor of Law at Yale Law
School, shared this insight with me based on his experience at NYU-IRC.
127. One federal judge lectured the attorneys and parties in a wage and hour case, that I
litigated with NYU-IRC, about the fact that he was used to adjudicating large-scale corporate
litigation and that we did not belong in his courtroom. In spite (or because) of his feelings, he took
a personal role in settlement negotiations and pushed the parties hard to come to an agreement, in
a way that could be said to have benefited the immigrant worker plaintiffs.
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especially if evidence existed of coordination between organizers, plaintiffs,
and lawyers. 28 The hostility of the courts to these methods is likely to increase
as use of coordinated litigation and organizing strategies spread.
Our opponents attempted to use the Taft-Hartley provisions of the NLRA
to curb the direct action methods of organizers, including the protests in front
of the restaurants. The corporation engaged ROC-NY in negotiations at one
point during the campaign, only to break them off after drafting a joint
memorandum of understanding that included improved conditions for all
workers. Shortly after ROC-NY returned to the front of the restaurants with
signs and megaphones, the employer filed a charge with the NLRB alleging
violation of the Taft-Hartley provisions. The NLRB fast-tracked investigation
of the charge, as they are required to do for employers under the provision (the
workers' Unfair Labor Practice charges alleging surveillance and intimidation
had been filed months earlier and did not receive fast-track treatment by the
agency). Under those provisions, entities that do not represent a majority of the
employees in a workplace cannot demand improved wages and benefits for all
workers through protests. 129 It is viewed as illegitimate to work towards
improving conditions for all workers when one only represents a minority of
the workforce. The standard emphasis on official worker representation (and
the corresponding barriers to establishing union representation through
elections) operates here to prevent activist workers and worker centers from
demanding better conditions for all. ROC-NY negotiated a settlement of the
charge with the NLRB and adjusted its direct action strategy to engage in the
labor-intensive activity of distributing leaflets during lunches and dinners at the
restaurant entrances, which was permitted under the NLRA. 13 Federal court
hostility to direct action and media advocacy and the NLRB's diligent
128. In a recent CUNY-IRRC wage and hour case on behalf of a domestic worker, a
federal magistrate judge, who delayed adjudication of our motions to compel discovery, acted
quickly when defendants complained to the court about demonstrations in front of a small
business that they own. The worker was ordered to appear before the judge for an evidentiary
hearing in which she was questioned about her membership in the worker-center that was
organizing the protests as well as her prior knowledge of the events. Defendants did not allege a
specific legal theory that would allow the court to prohibit First Amendment activities, but the
court was quick to impute a jury-tainting theory, which it ultimately rejected on the basis of clear
contrary precedent in the district. Lopez v. Meluzio et al., No. 05-00009 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2006)
(order adopting report and recommendation of magistrate denying defendants' motion for
injunctive relief).
129. See29U.S.C. §158(b).
130. One of the CUNY-IRRC students linked ROC-NY with an experienced labor lawyer,
Dan Clifton, who successfully defended the organization before the NLRB. He recently achieved
a significant victory for the organization and worker centers around the country by convincing the
NLRB that ROC-NY is not a labor organization and thus is not required to meet the filing burdens
under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1959)
(amended 1987); 29 U.S.C. § 402(i) (defining "labor organization"), §§ 431-441 (setting forth
reporting requirements). More importantly, worker centers are not bound by the NLRA's
constraints on secondary boycotts and picketing. See supra note 58.
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investigation of allegations against worker centers are only two examples of the
general antipathy of legal institutions towards the use of legal tactics to advance
collective action as well as extralegal tactics coordinated with litigation.
In the ROC-NY campaign, the concern about the limits placed by law on
collective action was resolved by the construction of a tripartite relationship
between lawyers, workers, and organizers. The organizers were essential in
helping the legal team gather evidence to mount an effective case, in ensuring
client participation in the litigation, and in preventing employer cooptation of
the workers over the long course of litigation. These challenges were
compounded as the number of plaintiffs in the litigation increased. The rules of
professional responsibility individualize the lawyer-client relationships by, for
example, prohibiting the influence of third-parties (organizers) in legal
decision-making and by creating an attorney-client privilege that a third party
risks piercing when present at meetings.13' This individualized construction is
deeply embedded in popular and legal culture. 132 The presence of the
organizers as a kind of political and practical intermediary between lawyers and
clients in the ROC-NY campaign test the boundaries of the traditional lawyer-
client relationship. While CUNY-IRRC was careful in meeting the formal
requirements of the rules and keeping legal decision-making within the
relationship between lawyers and clients, we also understood that the
organizers had developed the overall campaign strategy with the workers'
consent. In delineating lawyer-client decision making, we could either reject
the influence of the organizers or learn to discern the boundaries between
lawyer-client, lawyer-organizer, and client-organizer decision making. We
chose the latter. This naturally led to multiple communications and
complications, including disagreements between the lawyers and organizers as
to the timing and terms of settlement initiatives to be taken on behalf of the
workers. We were careful not to influence workers against their prior political
commitments to ROC-NY and the larger campaign and actually tried to
promote such values within our decision-making structure. The workers
131. See, e.g., N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 5-107 [1200.26] (B) ("Unless authorized by law, a lawyer shall not permit a person who
recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal service for another to direct or regulate
his or her professional judgment in rendering such legal services, or to cause the lawyer to
compromise the lawyer's duty to maintain the confidences and secrets of the client under DR 4-
101 [ 1200.19](B)." Id.).
132. The Code also prohibits lawyers from taking cases in which their exercise of
professional judgment may be affected by their own personal interest. See id. at DR 5-101.
Applied stringently, this rule would be grounds for disciplinary sanctions against most public
interest lawyers, on both the right and the left. However, the organized bar seems to accept some
degree of deviation from the formal rules to accommodate public interest legal activities that
legitimize the profession and mitigate the public perception that lawyers serve a fundamentally
mercenary and amoral function in society. See AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, Cause
Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional Authority: An Introduction, CAUSE LAWYERING:
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3-5 (1998).
[Vol. 95:18791910
LAWYERS AND RESISTANCE
seemed to understand these dynamics, partly due to their prior experience and
worker leadership of the campaign.
C. The Workers
While the lawyers and organizers planned, drafted, argued, and negotiated
from within the confines of our offices and in courtrooms and agency
conference rooms, the workers worked. They continued coping with difficult
and unlawful conditions, as well as pressure from both the organizers to
participate in the campaign and from their bosses to desist. ROC-NY and the
lawyers needed to rely on leadership from amongst the worker-members in the
campaign and the leaders' ability to nurture a critical mass of workers willing
to withstand the short-term benefits offered by the employer and stay in the
fight through completion.
1. Leaders
There was a dividing line in the restaurant: immigrants of color worked in
the "back of the house"-in lower-level positions in the kitchen and as bussers
and runners on the main floor-and mostly white employees worked in the front
of the house tending directly to diners. The immigrant employees at the
restaurant were largely from Mexico and Central America. They had varied
levels of English proficiency and of experience in the industry, though they
were required to demonstrate skills or to have been endorsed by other trusted
workers to be hired. They had decent salaries that were well above poverty line
wages. They ate restaurant food standing up during short breaks and the chef
would make some of the workers hamburgers at the end of the night depending
on his mood. Floriberto Hernandez was one of the fluent English speakers
amongst the workers and a favorite of the bosses. It was also Mr. Hernandez
who accompanied another worker to file a complaint against the bosses with
the U.S. DOL and when there was no action by U.S. DOL, he led a group of
workers to ROC-NY to protest about the lack of overtime and straight-time pay
at the restaurant. He calmly and clearly communicated their complaints about
management and the ways in which the working conditions were unjust. The
ROC-NY organizers quickly understood that he had the respect of the other
workers and that he understood the organization's broader goals, which went
beyond improving conditions at a single restaurant. As the campaign
progressed, Mr. Hernandez, working closely with Siby Sekou, a ROC-NY
organizer who had the initial contacts within the restaurant, helped maintain the
morale of workers. When workers at another restaurant owned by the parent
company approached ROC-NY, organizers conferred with Mr. Hernandez on
how to expand the campaign while maintaining group cohesion and the
allegiance of the original workers, who were being challenged by adverse
working conditions and the public demonstrations on their behalf in front of the
workplace.
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2. Retaliation and Cooptation
After the employer received a demand letter but prior to filing the
complaint, managers attempted to convince individual workers to sign release
agreements provided by the U.S. DOL that would prevent them from filing
private causes of action in court. The workers indicated that the agency arrived
at the restaurant with advance notice to the employer and interviewed a very
small number of workers. They said that the chosen interviewees were coached
by the head chef and the personnel manager to provide employer-friendly
testimony (one of the plaintiffs had been asked to interpret for the managers
during those coaching sessions). After the restaurant noticed that some of the
workers retained the clinic as their legal counsel and that a lawsuit would be
filed in federal district court, the head chef and personnel manager met with
individual workers to sign the release agreements (written in both English and
Spanish) indicating that their sole means of redress for wage and hour
violations would be through the agency and not through a private right of
action in court. Some of our clients signed the release agreements, others took
the papers home with them to show the organizers and lawyers, and still others
refused to sign on the spot (Mr. Hemandez was one such worker). Essential for
momentum in court and in the overall campaign, the legal team developed a
viable theory under which all of the workers could remain in the suit through
the common-law claims in spite of some having signed the U.S. DOL release
agreements. We thought that while the subset who signed the agreements were
now precluded from pursuing federal and state wage and hour claims in court,
they could still sustain contract and tort claims and remain part of the plaintiff
group.
The workers told us that individuals involved in the campaign were being
given fewer hours of work, that they were under heavier surveillance than usual
by agents of management, and that a few of them had been interrogated about
their involvement with ROC-NY. As a result of these reports, the student team
filed unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB on the grounds that these
practices were intended to retaliate against workers for their involvement in
"concerted activity," which is explicitly protected under federal law. 133
Conscientious NLRB staff initiated an investigation of the employer, though it
remained unclear throughout the campaign whether the agency could impose
penalties of any significance. At worst, the team viewed the NLRB charges as
another legal front in the campaign with the consequence of increasing the cost
to the employer of legal services. 134 The consequences of retaliation were more
133. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
134. The team was not aware of the nature of the fee arrangement between the employer
and the large law firm that it used. It is possible that the fim was receiving flat fees for services
rather than billing by the hour. The senior attorney on the case, who was also the managing
attorney of the firm's New York office, had a long-term relationship with the founder and C.E.O.
of the parent company and related this to the team to indicate his delegated authority in
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severe for one of our clients, who was fired by the corporation on the basis of
his inclusion in a letter from the Social Security Administration (SSA)
indicating that his name did not match the social security number in their
database. Though the team generated legal arguments against termination on
the basis of a no-match letter, it served as a source of prima facie legal leverage
that the employer could use to intimidate workers involved in organizing
campaigns, which has only gotten worse as SSA proceeded to draft more
stringent no-match rules.' 35 Students quickly learn that one of our key legal
roles in these campaigns was to undertake rapid response to allegations of
retaliation by the workers, including interviewing the affected worker and
organizers who usually first learn of the incident and communicating quickly
and strongly with opposing counsel. Workers who feel that lawyers and
organizers will not leave them completely vulnerable (because they remain
quite vulnerable despite our best efforts) are more likely to participate in
campaign activities and resist employer coercion.
Leadership and preservation of critical mass were two key attributes that
sustained the workers through the 18-month campaign. The organizers focused
on leadership identification and development and worked closely with Mr.
Hernandez until he passed away in July 2004. CUNY-IRRC was especially
focused on the cohesion of the plaintiff group, though we only had an indirect
role subsidiary to that of the organizers in nurturing our clients' collectivity.
We worked hard to prevent law and legal process from splitting the group
apart. The fact that we acted defensively after the employers had apparently co-
opted the U.S. DOL investigation and convinced workers to sign release
agreements indicates to me, in retrospect, that neither the organizers nor the
lawyers had effectively nurtured cohesion and accountability until later in the
campaign.
D. The Campaign
Both sides ground out the struggle, exchanging the advantage at various
points in 2004. While CUNY-IRRC tended to the federal litigation and the
NLRB investigation, ROC-NY was building a campaign to bring the workers'
complaints to the full attention of the employer and the public. The
organization put together a series of raucous demonstrations in front of the
restaurant with the support of student groups and allied worker centers. The
organizers met with the workers in the campaign on a regular basis, usually on
Sunday afternoons, to develop consensus around their demands and the means
by which the campaign would be conducted.
The students negotiated a discovery schedule with defense counsel,
striking a compromise between our speedier schedule and their lengthened
negotiations.
135. See supra note 34.
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timeline. The team drafted and transmitted interrogatories and document
requests for the defendants. They also interviewed the plaintiffs and drafted
responses to interrogatories and document requests on their behalf. Defense
counsel asked virtually the same questions of each of the sixteen workers but
chose to scramble the interrogatories and document requests so that the team
could not prepare a single template response to their discovery requests.
Defendants refused to answer our clients' discovery requests without a
confidentiality agreement that would forbid the legal team and the workers
from sharing any information provided by the restaurant to ROC-NY or HERE,
the restaurant worker's union with which ROC-NY was associated. Defendants
seemed most resistant to providing employee rosters and wage levels for
workers at the restaurants because of their fear that such information would
serve to unionize their workforce. In response, CUNY-IRRC moved to compel
discovery responses without the confidentiality agreement. At the second status
conference, the federal judge expressed puzzlement over our clients' refusal to
sign the broad confidentiality agreement proposed by the defendants;' 36 he
referred the issue to a magistrate judge and directed us to negotiate provisions
to which our clients could agree. 137 The court confirmed its hostility to any
kind of public law agenda in this suit when it refused to allow us to depose any
managers other than direct line supervisors in the restaurant. Our theory was
that this system of underpayment was a corporate policy and had been
implemented in multiple restaurants owned by the same corporation.
Additionally, the C.E.O. of the corporation was a man who was in the news
frequently and maintained a positive reputation in New York and international
social and political circles despite these conditions of employment at his
restaurants. From the beginning, the organizers focused on attaching a
corporate face to unlawful conditions of employment and these discovery
skirmishes represented our effort for preserving that possibility and defending
against the individualization and privatization of the litigation.
While the legal team was engaged in discovery disputes with defense
counsel, ROC-NY continued its program of demonstrations in front of the
restaurant. Additionally, workers from other restaurants owned by the parent
136. We counseled our clients to refuse to sign a broad confidentiality agreement for
political reasons - because they may choose to reveal information that they acquire in civil
litigation to ROC-NY or HERE - and for practical reasons - because organizers might help them
interpret and understand materials turned over by defendants.
137. It was at this hearing that the judge-angered at one point by his perception that
plaintiffs were being unreasonable and having recently been assigned a related case about work
conditions at another of the parent company's restaurants-lectured the legal team on what he
viewed as its role. He said derisively that the lawyers were not to use a case in his court to
advance a cause or to transform overall conditions in the industry. He instructed the team to
litigate the individual case and not to be unreasonable in negotiations. I was momentarily
speechless since the primary reason we had taken the case was to transform conditions in the
industry.
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company started speaking with the organization about more egregious wage
and hour violations, as well allegations of employment discrimination and the
creation of a hostile environment for some workers. These workers included
both back and front of the house workers and ROC-NY was able to identify
attorneys for these new groups of workers. 1
38
The defendants engaged in negotiations sporadically, depending on the
legal and political leverage they felt they had in the moment. The restaurant
filed a defamation case against ROC-NY and its individual staff in state court
on the basis of signs and statements made by organizers during the
demonstrations. An attorney with the Urban Justice Center Community
Development Project, who was also ROC-NY's nonprofit corporate counsel,
located an excellent pro bono First Amendment attorney from the New York
office of Davis, Wright & Tremaine to defend the organization in state court.
The attorney filed a strategic lawsuit against public participation motion1 39 in
opposition to the suit and defeated the restaurant's attempt to secure a
preliminary injunction against the demonstrations. The Taft-Hartley charge that
the corporation filed against ROC-NY and the consequent legal imperative for
the NLRB investigation 140 caused the corporation to suspend negotiations.
After the charge was settled with the assistance of experienced pro bono labor
counsel, 141 ROC-NY was able to devise new direct action methods against the
restaurant, and as it came closer to the time when their managers would be
deposed, the corporation seemed more amenable to settlement negotiations.
The retention of experienced pro bono counsel and their successful defense
neutralized the corporation's efforts to attack ROC-NY on new fronts. 1
42
After a year of direct action, media advocacy, and legal offense and
defense, the campaign against the parent company and the counter-campaign
initiated against ROC-NY were taking a toll on both sides. Tragically, five days
after he was deposed in the federal case, 38-year-old Floriberto Hernandez
passed away from dehydration caused by a diabetic condition of which he was
unaware. His co-workers and the organizers at ROC-NY were hit hard by the
loss and brought a poster-sized picture of him to each Sunday worker meeting,
hoping to inspire and animate the campaign. Lawyers on both sides started
138. Tony Lu and Haeyoung Yoon with the Community Development Project of the Urban
Justice Center filed a second wage and hour suit and Alex Reinert, an associate with the private
civil rights law firm of Koob & Magoolaghan, represented workers before the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission on discrimination grounds.
139. See supra note 75.
140. Discussed supra Sec. II.B.3.
141. See supra note 130.
142. The corporation also tried to pressure ROC-NY through less formal means. The well-
known C.EO. sent letters to ROC-NY's funders, emphasizing that the sympathetic support center for
9/1l workers and families had morphed into a Marxist activist group. These letters had no discernible
effect on the organization's sources of funding, though it was hard for ROC-NY to know whether
reduced grants or severed funding relationships were the indirect result of the restaurant's corporate
campaign against the organization.
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moving toward a basic agreement on major issues, after it became clear that the
principals were interested in resolving the conflict. A new student team
initiated a series of conference calls with opposing counsel and drafted an
omnibus settlement agreement on behalf of our clients, as well as the groups of
workers at the other subsidiary restaurants. The settlement agreement was fairly
unique for a worker center to win through a campaign because, in addition to
$164,000.00 in unpaid wages for the workers (both for our clients and those
from the other restaurants who had joined later in the campaign), ROC-NY
secured guaranteed sick days and paid vacation for all employees of the
restaurant and some measure of job security for our clients for one year
following the execution of the agreement. The identity of the high-end
restaurant corporation and these broader benefits brought press coverage of the
settlement in the New York Times. 1
43
The campaign was far from a victory march, even with the favorable
outcome we secured. Workers were in and out of the campaign, and the
organizers were juggling multiple priorities and were attacked-through legal
and non-legal means-throughout the eighteen month period. The lawyers were
constantly scrambling to maintain capacity and coordinate amongst a large,
legal team stitched together as a result of new developments. As a lawyer and a
teacher of law students, I felt challenged by the scope of the work and the
unorthodox structure of our relationships with workers, organizers, and co-
counsel. We also felt energized by our involvement in something larger than a
single case before a skeptical judge and we tried to harness that energy and
construct a role for ourselves in relation to the resistance movement.
III
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
In this part, I draw a set of modest conclusions based on the description of
the role of public interest lawyers in the campaign described above. The scope
of our participation in the collaboration was highly contingent and context-
specific and that is why I call these conclusions "modest" and possibly limited
in application to other sites and subjects of struggle. However, it is also clear to
me that an understanding of the complexities of this collaboration between
public interest lawyers and a modem resistance movement can help shape our
practice going forward, just as past interventions have shaped practice up to
this point. To that end, first, I note some of the discontinuities with the
established definition of the role of public interest lawyers, second, I revisit the
literatures describing lawyer domination of clients and the critique of rights and
rights-talk in light of our experience in the campaign, and, third, I discuss the
143. See Steven Greenhouse, Two Restaurants to Pay Workers $164,000, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
12, 2005, at B3. See also Lynda Richardson, Public Lives: For the Kitchen Help, She Stands the
Heat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at B4.
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specific role of public interest lawyers in relation to globalized social
movements. Though there is no certain path to efficacy for public interest
lawyers, it undoubtedly runs through the work of ambitious and energized
movement organizations.
A. Discontinuities
Legal scholarship celebrates the role of lawyers and judges in social
justice movements while social science research remains ambivalent. 1 Even
self-critical legal scholarship, in the Gerald Lopez/Lucie White thread,
emphasizes the importance of lawyers and amplifies the impact of the mistakes
that they make in relationships with poor clients and social justice movements.
Undoubtedly, articulating legal violations and filing complaints and charges in
this campaign formed essential steps in conferring legitimacy on the complaints
of the worker-members of ROC-NY. However, unlike conventional public
interest law, the legal work was not central to the larger campaign or to the
effort for building organizational capacity to improve working conditions in the
restaurant industry. The organizers and workers themselves defined the
problem area, chose targets within the industry, and directed public protest and
media advocacy with lawyers supporting these activities through affirmative
and defensive legal action. Another distinction between this campaign and
more traditional social justice advocacy by lawyers is that government was not
the target of litigation and direct action. 145 Instead, the resistance campaign was
built around protest against a corporation that engaged quite directly in the
exploitation of immigrant workers. This must increasingly be the case, as
government social welfare functions are stripped or outsourced and individuals
are coerced into the market for low-wage labor.
Somewhat paradoxically, litigation and protest against private actors
advanced initiatives to bring the state back into the relationship between
workers and employers in the restaurant industry. 146 Both within the clinic and
among the organizers, we regarded the state-represented by city council
members and governmental agency personnel-as an audience of the
campaign. Organizers and lawyers viewed the state as unreliable for a variety
of reasons, including their general perception that the government was hostage
to private interests on account of political patronage concerns and a pervasive
144. See Rajagopal, supra note 5, at 184-85.
145. Louise Trubek marked this transition in public interest law in the context of her
discussion of the changing work of the Center for Public Representation in Wisconsin. See Louise
Trubek, Old Wine in New Bottles: Public Interest Lawyering in an Era of Privatization, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1739 (2001).
146. For examples of the legislative successes of worker centers in New York, see
Greenhouse, supra note 79 (Domestic Workers United campaign); Michael Luo, Taxi Commission
Backs a 26% Rise For Fares in City, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at Al (NY Taxi Workers'
Alliance campaign).
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ideological affinity for the ascendancy of the "free market" among
policymakers and judges. The workers did not rely on the state for various
reasons, including their experience with the U.S. DOL in this campaign and the
overarching fear of immigration enforcement. However, the lawyers and
organizers understood that ultimately only the state could check the power of a
large number of employers in an industry that was largely non-unionized. The
workplace justice campaign also supported ROC-NY's research agenda in
spotlighting violations of state and federal laws in the industry, which in turn
supported its legislative agenda to empower the state to revoke restaurant
licenses because of wage and hour law violations. Each of these distinct
campaigns reinforced the other and fit into a larger effort to reconfigure the
allocation of power in the industry. ROC-NY launched these initiatives to
change the incentive structure in the restaurant industry, which was biased
heavily against workers, and to encourage state intervention on the side of
workers. The lawyers used their expertise, with an understanding of larger
political and economic shifts, in service of this greater resistance agenda.
Though the context of the legal work in the campaign may have been
discontinuous with certain traditional modes of public interest legal advocacy
(impact litigation, legal services, lawyer as organizer), the core legal work
remained the same, whether nested in a resistance campaign or in one of the
more traditional modes. It may be that a lawyer's knowledge and skills base are
modified in accordance with the identity of the targets of a campaign and the
relative sophistication of those targets. But the instinct to provide zealous
advocacy in an adversarial context remains constant and is perhaps, in light of
the relative diminishment of the state's role in economic relationships, more
important than in any preceding moment in recent history.
B. Accountability to Clients
The fear pervading progressive legal practice, that lawyers would
dominate their clients and social justice movements, has encouraged efforts to
move social justice work out of law offices and the courts. 147 In this campaign,
unlike in many of the stock stories from the poverty lawyering literature,
government was not the target of legal action. Lawyers were less likely to
subordinate clients on behalf of the welfare or criminal justice systems.
148
Instead, organizers and workers held lawyers accountable, and we were
relatively free to engage in the work without inhibition and fear that they would
dominate their individual or organizational clients. 149
147. See Lobel, supra note 117.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 114-117.
149. Gary Bellow best captured the possibilities of a dynamic and committed relationship
between lawyer and client to which the team aspired:
Alliance seems as good a word as any to describe this relationship because alliances
generate bonds and dependencies and are grounded, at least in aspiration, in forms of
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To be sure, this redirection of power was not easy or unproblematic.
150
There were times during the campaign when some members of the legal team
resorted to assertions of the professional responsibility rules to ensure that the
workers were not subverted by the organizers, especially in legal decision-
making. When we approached the organizers mid-campaign in disagreement
with their decision not to open negotiations with the employer, we felt caught
between our professional obligations, our intuitions, and the larger goals for
which we were fighting. Optimizing the balance of power between lawyers,
workers, and organizers is of course a project that is far from resolved,
especially in light of the challenges that the rules of professional responsibility
pose for these relationships. Difficulties in this area have arisen in all of the
collaborations between lawyers and worker centers in which the model has
predominated. Although the instances of conflict we faced were difficult (and
perhaps exacerbated by the rapidity of developments and the small size of
ROC-NY's organizing staff) it was our overall sense that the plaintiffs in the
legal cases understood the methods and goals of the larger campaign, the
importance of organizational capacity-building, and that recovery of unpaid
wages was the central component of an overall strategy. The lawyers who drew
on the experience of labor lawyers' 5 1 rather than the experience of a
respect and mutuality that are far more personal and compelling, for many of us who do
political legal work, than the demands of some notion of client-centered lawyering, no
matter how strongly held. Alliance also seems to offer an ideal that permits us to talk
seriously about purposive judgment-when and whether to intervene or to seek
influence-in situations in which one has unequal power in a relationship. The ideal of
alliance avoids oversentimentalized and categorical attitudes-my client, the victims,
the hero-toward clients. Such an orientation seems necessary in any honestly mutual
relationship and is especially important when working with groups in which issues of
which faction one serves constantly arise, and where humor, patience, and a genuine
fondness for and realism about the individuals involved are often all one has to
maintain one's bearings until some particular storm subsides.
Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner's Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 297, 303 (1996) (citations omitted). An additional consideration that arises in this
context is whether lawyers are in-house with their client organization or situated in an independent
practice setting. The lawyers in this campaign were based in offices outside of the movement
organization and, thus, had limited power in organizing and organizational capacity-building,
though the team was cognizant of the opportunities and constraints facing the organization. Cf
Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor: The United Farm Workers' Legal Strategy in the
1960s and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union Organizing Today, 8 U. PENN. J. LAB. EMPL. L. 1,
47-49 (2005) (discussing creation of the union's legal department five years after its establishment
and thus subordinate to the union's larger goals; in-house legal department strengthened rather
than weakened lawyer accountability).
150. For a discussion of similar problems, see Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold, What
Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social Movements, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS, supra note 109, at 2-3 (discussing constraints imposed by social movements on
affiliated lawyers).
151. It is necessary to represent groups of relatively powerless people rather than
individuals and that this devotion to collective representation did not disempower individuals but
was necessitated by the adversarial context in which we fought. See Gordon, supra note 149, at
10-44 (describing the collaboration between UFW organizers and lawyers).
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conventional public interest lawyer focused on an individual client or a class of
individual clients were better able to cope with the shifting balance of power
between lawyers, organizers, and workers. The collective representation frame
allowed lawyers to temper the formalism of the professional responsibility rules
and to weather the periodic marginalization of lawyers within campaign
decision-making. 1
52
C. The Role of Rights and Rights Talk
The lawyers and organizers in the campaign were familiar with the
perspective of critical race theorists such as Patricia Williams and Kimberle
Crenshaw, and the participants' actions reflected their more abstract conceptual
perspective of the broader socio-economic challenges they faced. They had an
understanding of the constructed and contingent nature of law slanted in favor
of power, but they refused to give up rights and rights talk, which helped them
win protections and gains for the workers. 53 Such a focus on entitlements is
inconsistent with parts of the legal and political science literatures on the
efficacy of rights and rights talk. 154 That body of work underemphasizes the
role that the particular cultural, economic, and political contexts play in
determining the appropriateness of an entitlement-based approach.15 5 Our
campaign continuously centered its attention "on the importance of political
mobilization for the success of rights-centered strategies."' 156 Contrary to the
argument against adversarial models of lawyering made by advocates of
governance models, 157 this style of lawyering places rights within the context
152. See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV.
1103 (1992) (Ellmann discusses the challenges of group representation in a non-union context and
develops tactics with which to approach the problem of collective representation in a highly
individualized profession. It is important to do more work along these lines (as well as the work
being done by Jennifer Gordon to map the collaborations between lawyers and activist unions) to
alter the professional self-conception of public interest lawyers).
153. See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Kimberle
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
154. See supra Sec. II.B.3.
155. See Rajagopal, supra note 5, at 170. But see Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An
Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987) ("Nonetheless, I worry about criticizing rights
and legal language just when they have become available to people who had previously lacked
access to them. I worry about those who have, telling those who do not, 'you do not need it, you
should not want it.' But, rather than trash rights, I join in the efforts to reclaim and reinvent them.
Whether and how to use words to constrain power are questions that should be answered by those
who lack it. For this task, rights rhetoric is remarkably well-suited. It enables a devastating, if
rhetorical, exposure of and challenge to hierarchies of power." Id. at 1910).
156. de Sousa Santos & Rodriguez-Garavito, Law, Politics, and the Subaltern in Counter-
hegemonic Globalization in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW, supra note 5 at 15 (2005).
157. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); William Simon,
Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. &
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of a larger political struggle and is a necessary prerequisite to the participation
of workers and organizers in less adversarial and more deliberative political
structures, such as policy-making bodies and non-governmental organizations,
with representatives of the state and private entities.'
58
Further, in the specific case of immigrant workers, the assertion of rights
through litigation can, at least partly, compensate for their lack of legal status
as they attempt to assert countervailing power159 in their workplaces and
communities. Aggressive immigration enforcement makes it more difficult for
immigrant workers to claim a form of "de-nationalized" citizenship through
social and economic participation. 160 However, active participation in rights-
based campaigns and in organization-building strengthens the sense of
membership in American communities and the solidarity of some of the
immigrant workers. 161 Rights-based campaigns advance the goals of organizers
to motivate and unite immigrant workers while also enabling lawyers to draw
on sub-cultures of resistance to alter the legal and political process, sometimes
in ways that might make social justice more attainable in subsequent
campaigns.
D. Social Movements
There would have been no campaign in which public interest lawyers
could participate in the absence of the movement organization in this case
study. Movements complicate and amplify the work of public interest lawyers.
We provide essential functions to movement organizations and we depend upon
them for the nurturing of cohesive groups of people willing to fight to improve
their workplaces and communities. Public interest lawyers and movement
organizations have much to gain from collaboration but it is important to think
carefully about the role that each will play in the other's work and for there to
be a common set of political commitments and approaches. The understanding
of the lawyer's role and the set of commitments shared in the ROC-NY
campaign are delineated below.
MARY L. REV. 127 (2004).
158. de Sousa Santos & Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 156, at 16.
159. See generally Karl Klare, Countervailing Workers' Power as a Regulatory Strategy,
in LEGAL REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION, Ch. 3 (Hugh Collins et al. eds., 2000).
160. See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447,
461-62 (2000) ("Yet, the fact that aliens enjoy these rights does not mean that their formal or
nominal legal status vis-i-vis the political community in which they reside has changed. When
citizenship is understood as formal legal membership in the polity, aliens remain outsiders to
citizenship: they reside in the host country only at the country's discretion; there are often
restrictions imposed on their travel; they are denied the right to participate politically at the
national level; and they are often precluded from naturalizing. Furthermore, they symbolically
remain outsiders to membership in the polity." Id. at 462 (citations omitted)).
161. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 156-73 (discussing the solidarity effects of rights talk
and assertion and the creation of a new, more collective, immigrant identity).
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1. Lawyers as Intermediaries Between Movements and the State
Lawyers can help movement organizations resist cooptation by the state and
facilitate fragile collaborations with agencies. 162 In this campaign, lawyers
represented the worker-members of ROC-NY in federal court; the
organization never appeared before the judge, who appeared uncomfortable
with the idea that an individual lawsuit might be nested in a larger
organizing campaign involving direct action and media advocacy. ROC-NY
could draw on the legitimacy of a legal complaint for underpinning its
direct action and media advocacy program, without submitting to the
court's jurisdiction and its rules. Lawyers were also essential in defensive
litigation when ROC-NY was named as a party in cases before a state court
and the NLRB.
Worker centers may resist using lawyers as intermediaries with
governmental agencies, as organizers may seek to decentralize lawyers in
campaigns and gain recognition from legislators and other political actors as
the leading representatives of workers. It is shortsighted, however, to do so, as
lawyers, in addition to possessing technical skills that can be of use in policy
advocacy, can help movement organizations maintain distance from
governmental and private entities, which in turn might help organizations
remain oppositional and retain movement vitality. 163 If lawyers understood and
were properly trained in law school clinics and public interest organizations to
act as intermediaries between movement organizations and the state, those
organizations might feel more comfortable entrusting them with this essential
role.
2. A Global Transformative Paradigm of Social Change and Cross-racial
162. See Lobel, supra note 117, at 942-59.
163. See FRANCES Fox PIVEN AND RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS:
WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 1-40 (1979) (describing how protest movements lose
power through institutional accommodation and coercion). Lobel accurately depicts the fear of
cooption as a driving force in the acceptance or rejection by movement organizations of social
justice strategies. Cooption has driven organizers and lawyers toward extralegal activism.
However, I would not characterize the campaign described in this article or many of the legal
collaborations with worker centers as a retreat from the law and toward civil society, as Lobel
does. See Lobel, supra note 117, at 961-62. In fact, movement organizations usually prevent their
lawyers from yielding to the psychosocial allure of softer informal normativities (which
characterize the non-adversarial and discursive governance structures advocated by Lobel and
others, see supra note 157). For most people, even lawyers, public confrontation is a more
challenging enterprise than collaborative negotiations and the solidarity and direct action tactics of
movement organizations embolden lawyers. Correspondingly, lawyers represent movement
organizations in courts and legislatures on basic terms set by organizers and workers and allow the
organizations to resist cooption while remaining engaged in law reform projects. See Sheila
Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the
Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 775, 826-41
(1998) (illustrating the potential dialectic between political participation/law reform and





Worker centers such as ROC-NY embrace a new paradigm of social
change and cross-racial solidarity.165 The civil rights movements, anti-colonial
liberation struggles, and the radical labor movements are the historical
antecedents of these organizations, which frequently turn to their forebears for
inspiration and guidance. But in terms of their organizational structure and
issue selection, contemporary organizers use an original approach that reflects
cognizance of current conditions. Conceptually, the paradigm is global-linked
to networks of advocates in multiple areas and across national borders 166-and
transformative, rooted in a radical democratic vision of the participation of
members, which includes citizen and non-citizen and largely people of color, in
politics. 167 Most worker centers conceptualize its work as opposed to the forces
of neoliberal globalization, which adversely affects poor people by constructing
ways in which their very presence in a location is illegal, by effectively forcing
them to labor under worsening conditions created by deregulated market forces.
The centers are in ideological, if not actual, communion with activists who
oppose a World Bank-sponsored dam in India, indigenous people demanding
economic and social rights in Chiapas, and AIDS activists in South Africa
fighting for access to affordable generic drugs. 168  These movement
organizations demolish the false dichotomy advanced by the Old Left between
radical politics and identity politics 169 by focusing on the interaction between
164. The ideas in this section in part reflect the work of Families for Freedom (FFF), a
movement organization with which CUNY-IRRC collaborates but that is not a workers center.
Founded in 2002, FFF is a New York-based non-profit organization that defends and supports
immigrant communities against the federal government's aggressive detention and deportation
policies. See FFF website homepage, http://www.familiesforfreedom.org (last visited Aug. 15,
2007).
165. Angela Harris describes this paradigm from a legal theoretical standpoint, in which
default identity characteristics, such as race, gender, and sexual orientation, are neither ignored
nor do they serve as the central organizing principle of social movements. Supra note 1, at 783-84.
Instead, as Robert Chang argues, "people of color" solidarity in the service of a progressive
agenda must be built on the basis of a new subject position, one that comes with political
commitments and through struggle. See Robert Chang, The End of Innocence or Politics After the
Fall of the Essential, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 687, 690-94 (1996). This substantive radical democratic
project is central to the movement organizations described in this article, see id. at 692.
166. See Fran Ansley, Inclusive Boundaries and Other (Im)possible Paths Toward
Community Development in a Global World, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 353, 405-11 (2001) (setting forth
an aspiration for globalized social movements in the U.S.).
167. Movement organizations such as ROC-NY, pursue the radical democratic engagement
of its members in politics, not in grassroots activism outside of the sphere of the political process.
See Lobel, supra note 117, at 963-64 (discussing the robust political engagement of the "M-
stream" from the desiccated extra-political self-organization of the "L-stream" to define "civil
society" and consigning grassroots activists to the latter) (citing Charles Taylor, Invoking Civil
Society, in WORKING PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CENTER FOR PSYCHOSOCIAL STUDIES I-
17)).
168. See generally de Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 158.
169. See, e.g., TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS: WHY AMERICA IS
WRACKED BY CULTURE WARS (1996).
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racial, economic, and political subordination. 1
70
The membership itself is global and in some cases constituents have direct
ties to movements in their countries of origin. Their project includes leadership
development so that their members may testify as to their own conditions of
life and work and demand remedies in courts and legislatures. They make
strong and constant efforts to maintain a diverse membership; their members
are allies who work to realize common aims, not components of a coalition
with contingent common interests. 171 The organizations search for groups of
plaintiffs in litigation or witnesses in legislative efforts across racial and
immigration status lines. Though the late addition of new groups of workers in
the ROC-NY campaign complicated matters by allowing some workers to
benefit disproportionately from the longer participation and endurance of other
workers, the organizers pushed hard to include the new workers-both for
attacking the parent corporation at multiple restaurants and because the new
groups included not just Latino but also South Asian immigrants, and therefore
more accurately represented the workforce of the corporation.
.Worker centers such as ROC-NY have a clear picture of the way in which
immigration status or constructed illegality 172 harms their membership and
weakens their organizing efforts, but they view this as a condition to challenge
and change, rather than a limit on the issues and members they may embrace.
Though deportation and detention remains a possibility for most of the
membership, the organizers attempt to keep workers engaged in political
struggle and endeavor to protect members when immigrant enforcement is used
as a tactical offensive. Leaders make every effort to minimize distinctions
between members based on their legal status, because organizers recognize that
the restaurant worker detained after going to a Special Registration interview is
no more "innocent" or "guilty" than the janitor who committed a crime and
already served time in a state prison.173 They see these individuals and families
as part of a united struggle against a system of constructed illegality and racial
subordination-and their organizational structures and targets of social change
reflect that central mission.
The global, transformative paradigm expands the scope and ambition of
170. See Penelope Andrews, Globalization, Human Rights, and Critical Race Feminism:
Voices from the Margins, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 373, 395-99 (2000) (discussing critical race
feminism application in international human rights); Cornel West, The Role of Law in Progressive
Politics, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1797 (1990).
171. See generally Victor C. Romero, Rethinking Minority Coalition Building: Valuing
Self-sacrifice, Stewardship, and Anti-subordination, 50 VILL. L. REv. 823 (2005) (discussing the
difficulties of coalition-building and proposing first principles that might overcome those
challenges).
172. See Ngai, supra note 46, at 56-90 (discussing the construction of illegality through
deportation policy).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 34-43.
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public interest lawyers. 174 As in corporate law, the global alliances and
ambitions of clients cause lawyers to think and act globally, for example, by
filing complaints on behalf of worker-members with international tribunals and
including international law claims in federal complaints.175  These
collaborations with global, transformative organizations may also encourage
more substantive interaction between public interest lawyers across borders,
which has remained limited to date, with American lawyers tending to use
international mechanisms unilaterally but failing to engage progressive legal
allies outside of the U.S. 176 The expansive and energized political vision of
networked social movement organizations has much to offer public interest
lawyers. It is up to us to identify and develop relationships of trust with specific
organizations and to collaboratively advance successive campaigns of
resistance.
CONCLUSION
Far from signaling a retreat from the legal and political process, the
changing dynamic between public interest lawyers and resistance movements
reflects a healthy mutual engagement--one with the potential to achieve both
parties' substantive goals more effectively than traditional models of public
interest lawyering would allow. Even as the state and powerful private entities
assert the entrenched prejudices of liberal legalism against resistance
movements, these movements reshape public interest lawyering, and law more
generally, through innovative collaborations. There is tension and stress in
these relationships, as is to be expected in any partnership between hard-headed
and driven actors operating within a set of firmly established constraints. Public
interest lawyers can negotiate professional constraints in collaborations with
resistance movements and collectively it is within our capacity to carry out our
moral and professional responsibility for the advancement ofjustice. I hope that
this description and interpretation, in some small way, evokes faith in our
potential to achieve justice in an otherwise callous and heartbreaking historical
moment.
174. Lucie White describes an aspirational "third dimension" model that sets a benchmark
for what public interest lawyers can hope to achieve in collaboration with movement
organizations. See Lucie White, To Learn and Teach: Lesson from Driefontein on Lawyering and
Power, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 699, 760-68 (1988).
175. See supra notes 80-85.
176. See generally Rhonda Copelon, The Indivisible Framework of International Human
Rights: A Source of Social Justice in the US., 3 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 59 (1998) (discussing the
potential impact of international law applications in the U.S.).
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